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SENTENCING RULES AND STANDARDS:
HOW WE DECIDE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
JACOB SCHUMAN*
Over the past 300 years, American sentencing policy has
alternated between "determinate" and "indeterminate" systems of
deciding punishment. Debates over sentence determinacy have so far
focused on three main questions: Who should decide punishment?
What makes punishment fair? Why should we punish wrongdoers at
all?
In this Article, I ask a new, fourth question: How should we
decide punishment? First, I demonstrate that determinate sentencing
uses rules to decide sentences, while indeterminate sentencing relies
on standards.Next, I show how the trigger-basednature of rules-in
contrast to the qualitative character of standards-makes them
vulnerable to four different kinds of substantive and formal errors.
Applying that analysis, I argue that district court judges often use
"departures"and "variances"from the FederalSentencing Guidelines
to correct the errors that result from rule-based decision-making
instead of sentencing based on the § 3553(a) standard. Finally, I
propose that judges should be more willing to depart or vary from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in cases where the Sentencing
Guidelines would otherwise impose particularly large or numerous
sentence adjustments because these adjustments exacerbate the
impact of rule-based errors.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past 300 years, American sentencing policy has
alternated between "determinate" and "indeterminate" systems of
deciding punishment. Debates over sentence determinacy have so far
focused on three main questions: Who should decide punishment?
What makes punishment fair? Why should we punish wrongdoers at
all?
In this Article, I ask a new, fourth question: How should we
decide punishment? First, I demonstrate that determinate
sentencing uses rules to decide sentences, while indeterminate
sentencing relies on standards. Next, I show how the trigger-based
nature of rules-in contrast to the qualitative character of
standards-makes them vulnerable to four different kinds of
substantive and formal errors. Applying that analysis, I argue that
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district court judges often use "departures" and "variances" from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") to correct the errors
that result from rule-based decision-making instead of sentencing
based on the § 3553(a) standard. Finally, I propose that judges
should be more willing to depart or vary from the Sentencing
Guidelines in cases where the Sentencing Guidelines would
otherwise impose particularly large or numerous sentence
adjustments because these adjustments exacerbate the impact of
rule-based errors.
Systems of criminal punishment take two basic forms:
and "indeterminate" sentencing.'
"determinate" sentencing
Determinate sentencing means that the law defines a set penalty for
each crime, which automatically applies to all offenders. 2 The Book
of Exodus, for example, commands a determinate sentence for
murder: "He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put
to death."3 Indeterminate sentencing, by contrast, means that the
law prescribes a broad range of possible penalties for each crime and
then allows judges to choose an appropriate sentence for each
individual wrongdoer. 4 In the 1970s, the federal crime of rape
carried an indeterminate sentence: "Whoever, within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, commits
rape shall suffer death, or imprisonment for any term of years or for
life." 5 "Sentence determinacy," then, is the degree to which the

punishment for a crime is decided in advance of its commission.
Most sentencing systems, of course, are neither entirely
determinate nor entirely indeterminate. Instead, most systems fall

1. These labels have not been used consistently. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 86 (1973); Frank 0. Bowman, III, The
Quality of Mercy Must be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 679, 680-84 (1996). The main
alternative definitions of the terms turn on the availability of parole. According to
such characterizations, a "determinate" regime is one in which a defendant must
serve out the full prison term imposed at the time of sentencing, while an
"indeterminate" regime permits the offender to obtain early release, typically at the
discretion of a parole board. See Bowman, supra at 681-82. Rather than
"legislatively fixed" or "judicially fixed," an indeterminate regime under this
definition might be described as an "administratively fixed" model of sentencing.
Alan M. Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the United States: An Historical and
Conceptual Overview, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 117, 129-30 (1976).
While the availability of parole has some relevance to the definitions I use above, it is
largely beyond the scope of my argument.
2. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978).
3. Exod. 21:12 (King James).
4. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1970).
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somewhere along a spectrum of determinacy. In this Article, I show
how the spectrum of sentence determinacy has defined the past 300
years of punishment policy in the United States, which I trace across
four main eras: first, the Colonial Era, defined by determinate
sentencing; second, the post-Civil War Era, when the nation shifted
to indeterminate sentencing; third, the Guidelines Era, marked by
the development of determinate-guidelines regimes; and finally,
today's Booker Era, in which the federal government uses a hybrid
approach to punishment that combines elements of both determinate
and indeterminate sentencing systems.
The determinacy spectrum may appear, on the surface, to simply
be a measure of the discretion allowed to judges-determinate
sentencing systems give judges less discretion, while indeterminate
sentencing systems provide them more discretion. 6 The distinction,
however, runs far deeper than that, and in fact, implicates some of
the most important issues in sentencing policy, including
institutional choice, justice, and theories of punishment. In this
Article, I review these subjects and then raise a new, fourth issue:
the form that sentencing directives take. Jurists have long
recognized two basic forms of legal directive: "rules" turn on specific
triggers, while "standards" apply a qualitative analysis. Applying
this distinction to the law of sentencing, I contend that determinate
sentencing uses a rule-based method of deciding punishment,
whereas indeterminate sentencing employs a standard-based
approach.
This rules-versus-standards distinction helps to explain-and
may even help to improve-the current federal system of hybrid
sentencing. I demonstrate that rule-based reasoning uses factual
and normative triggers to make decisions, whereas standard-based
reasoning applies a qualitative analysis. This difference leads rules
to commit two categories of error-substantive and formal-that are
comprised of four types of erroneous rules-incomplete rules,
incorrect rules, bumpy rules, and disaggregated rules. I argue that
federal law attempts to identify and correct such errors through the
use of "departures" and "variances," which permit judges in certain
cases to reject the rule-based Federal Sentencing Guidelines in favor
of the § 3553(a) factors for sentencing; but, it does so only
haphazardly. I contend that sentencing policymakers and
practitioners must do more to correct rule-based errors, especially in
cases where sentence adjustments are particularly large or
particularly numerous.

6. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 885-99 (1990).
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In Part I of this Article, I recount the history of American
sentencing policy by tracing it across four separate eras, each
defined by its relationship to the determinate/indeterminatesentencing spectrum. In Part II, I review the three fundamental
questions of sentencing policy that have so far been asked in
discussions of sentence determinacy: Who should decide
punishment? What makes punishment fair? Why do we punish
wrongdoers? In Part III, I ask a new, fourth question, applying the
notion of legal form: How should we decide punishment? In Part IV,
I argue that the nature of rule-based decision-making leads it to
commit four different kinds of errors, involving both legal substance
and form, and demonstrate how the federal law of sentencing
recognizes these errors and tries-inconsistently-to correct them.
Finally, in Part V, I conclude that correcting rule-based errors may
improve sentencing as well as legal decision-making more broadly.
I. FOUR ERAS OF AMERICAN SENTENCING POLICY

The history of American criminal punishment comprises four
distinct eras, each defined by its relationship to the spectrum of
sentence determinacy:
A. The Colonial Era: Determinate Sentencing;
B. The Post-Civil War Era: Indeterminate Sentencing;
C. The Guidelines Era: Determinate-Guidelines Sentencing; and
D. The Booker Era: Hybrid Sentencing.
In this Part, I tell the story of these four eras of sentencing
policy.7 Section A begins with determinate sentencing in the colonial
era, when legislatures set fixed punishments for each crime. Part B
traces the shift toward indeterminate sentencing in the era following
the Civil War, when legislatures gave judges discretion to select an
appropriate sentence for each individual offender. Part C examines
the backlash against indeterminate sentencing in the 1970s, which
led jurisdictions to restore determinacy to punishment through the
adoption of sentencing guidelines. Finally, Part D shows how the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker created a
'hybrid" sentencing system on the federal level, which combines
8
aspects of both determinate and indeterminate sentencing.

7.
8.

See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 124-29.
543 U.S. 220, 262 (2005).
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A. The ColonialEra: Determinate Sentencing
From colonial times up to the early nineteenth century,
Americans used determinate systems of sentencing. 9 Under this
approach, the legislature prescribed a set sentence for each crime,
applicable equally to all who violated the law, in order to provide
"retribution and punishment" for wrongdoing.10
The colonies inherited" their criminal law from England, where
Parliament mandated capital punishment for all felony offenses and
prescribed corporeal punishments or fines for the rest. 12 Similarly, in
the early days of the United States, colonial legislatures enacted
criminal codes under which "[s]pecific crimes were punished... with
relatively specific penalties."'13 "Often, th[e] prescription was
death."'14 The 1648 Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, for
example, imposed a mandatory, automatic death sentence for a large
variety of crimes, including most forms of homicide, kidnapping, and
adultery. 15 For lesser violations, the Laws and Liberties imposed set

9. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46-49 (1978).
10. Id. at 46; see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1940
(1988) (stating that "[m]any early examples of sentencing law focused on retribution
and restitution").
11. See Nagel, supra note 6, at 892.
12. Blackstone counted 160 crimes "worthy of instant death." 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18.

The idea of felony is indeed so generally connected with that of capital
punishment, that we find it hard to separate them; and to this usage the
interpretations of the law do now conform. And therefore if a statute makes
any new offense felony, the law implies that it shall be punished with
death.
Id. at *98.
13. Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 124; see also Grayson, 438 U.S. at 45-46
(stating that "[i]n the early days of the Republic ... [e]ach crime had [a] defined
punishment"); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's
ConstitutionalRole in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 70-71
(2003) (arguing that giving juries the power to impose specific levels of punishment
would protect a defendant's liberty interest and provide a check on government
abuses); Judge Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little
Law, Too Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 693--94

(2010) (describing the history and evolution of American sentencing approaches).
14. Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 125.
15. See Lauues and Libertyes of Massachusetts (1648), http://www.commonlaw.
com/Mass.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016); see also Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 12425 (describing the various criminal sentencing periods throughout United States
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fines or specified forms of torture, including branding, forced labor,
whipping, time in the stocks, or cutting off of the ears. 16 Although
colonial legislatures sometimes provided some limited discretion for
judges to vary "the duration of an offender's stay in the stocks or the
pillory . . . in general, punishments were legislatively prescribed

with some precision."'17 Even after the Revolutionary War, when
incarceration began to supplant torture and execution as the
preferred mode of punishment, the prison term for each crime was
8
still "generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature."'
Under Colonial Era determinate sentencing, the imposition of
punishment "was merely a ministerial act." 19 Because the legislature
mandated a specific consequence for each specific crime, all a judge
had to do after a jury returned a guilty verdict was look up the
applicable punishment and impose it on the defendant. This was "a
ceremonial rather than a decision making process" 20 and followed "at

once" upon conviction. 21 Sentencing would not develop as "a truly
distinct procedural phase" until the latter half of the 19th century,
when jurisdictions in the United States began to move toward
22
indeterminate systems of punishment.
B. The Post-Civil War Era: Indeterminate Sentencing
American sentencing policy began to change following the
Revolutionary War, and especially after the Civil War, as the
country reformed its laws to adopt indeterminate-sentencing
systems. Under this approach, the legislature set a broad range of
possible penalties for each crime and gave judges "virtually
unlimited discretion" to select an appropriate punishment for each
23
individual offender.

history).

16.

See Dershowitz, supra note
supra note 15.

1, at 124-25;

Lauues and Libertyes of

Massachusetts,

17. Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 125.
18. Nagel, supra note 6, at 892; see also Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 125-26
(stating that following the Revolutionary War the legislature determined sentencing
ranges and gave the judiciary limited, narrow discretion to impose sentences).
19. Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 302 (1992).

20. Note, ProceduralDue Processat Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 821, 821 (1968).
21. SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 457 (1883).
22.
23.

Herman, supra note 19.
Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failureof the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
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Three developments in American criminal law spurred the
transition from determinate to indeterminate sentencing. First, the
"excessive rigidity" of determinate-sentencing systems grew
unpopular as it became apparent that not every criminal act within
24
a particular offense category deserved the same exact punishment.
Beginning in the early 1800s, some jurisdictions reformed their laws
to allow judges "to consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances surrounding an offense" and to adjust offenders'
punishments accordingly. 25 Second, around the same time,
incarceration gained favor as a more humane alternative to capital
punishment. 26 A prison term is a "quantifiable sanction," unlike a
death sentence, which meant judges needed the discretion to select
an appropriate period of incarceration for each offender. 27 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, rehabilitation replaced retribution as
the primary goal of criminal punishment. 28 While before, criminal
punishment was intended to exact vengeance on wrongdoers, the
new, "medical" theory of crime 29 held that incarceration was a kind

StructuralAnalysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1322 (2005); see also United States v.

Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1978) (stating that a movement began in the late
nineteenth century proposing a flexible sentencing system that gave judges more
discretion in determining the appropriate punishment).
24. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46-47 (quoting Paul W. Tappan, Sentencing Under the
Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 528, 529 (1958)); Nagel, supra note 6,

at 892-93.
25. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46-47 (quoting Paul W. Tappan, Sentencing Under the
Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 528, 529 (1958)) (internal quotation

marks omitted); Nagel, supra note 6, at 892-93.
26. See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 125-26; Nagel, supra note 6, at 892-93.
27. Herman, supra note 19.
28. The National Congress of Prisons expressed this shift in perspective in
1870, declaring:
The treatment of criminals by society is for the protection of society. But
since such treatment is directed to the criminal rather than to the crime, its
great object should be his moral regeneration. Hence the supreme aim of
prison discipline is the reformation of criminals, not the infliction of
vindictive suffering.
Declaration of Principles Adopted and Promulgated by the 1870 Congress of the
National PrisonAssociation, AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.

aca.org/ACA_- PRODIMIS/docs/1870Declaration of Principles.pdf (last visited Dec.
23, 2015).
29. Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 128; see also Douglas A. Berman,
Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 388-89 (2006) (noting that "[t]he
rehabilitative ideal was often conceived and discussed in medical terms"); Bowman,
supra note 23, at 1321 (describing the dominancy of the rehabilitative ideal
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of "treatment" for convicts who were considered "sick."30 "[T]hrough
carefully calibrated systems of discipline, labor, and religious
exhortation," it was hoped that prison could 'cure' . . . offender[s] of
[their] criminogenic patholog[ies]. '"31 This approach to punishment
called for "a flexible sentencing system permitting judges .

.

. to set

the release date of prisoners according to informed judgments
concerning their potential for, or actual, rehabilitation and their
32
likely recidivism."
By the 1960s, every jurisdiction in the country, including the
federal government, had adopted an indeterminate-sentencing
regime. 3 3 As mentioned earlier for example, the federal law of rape
at that time was almost purely indeterminate.3 4 A rapist convicted
in federal court might walk free, face death, or spend any number of
years in prison; it was entirely up to the sentencing judge. Most
criminal statutes, of course, did not give judges such limitless
discretion and instead set-quite broad-maximum and minimum
bounds on the possible punishments for each offense. The federal
crime of racketeering, for instance, could be punished with a fine of
up to $25,000, a term of imprisonment of up to twenty years, or
35
both.
Jurisdictions that adopted indeterminate-sentencing regimes
also added a new stage to their criminal proceedings: the sentencing
hearing. When a judge chose a punishment for an offender, he or she
often had to weigh evidence that would be considered irrelevant or
prejudicial if presented to a jury.36 "[M]ost jurisdictions assumed,"
therefore, "that a separate sentencing proceeding was needed to
develop whatever . . . facts the sentencing judge might consider

throughout much of the twentieth century); Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland,
Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 14 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROc. 225, 226 (1984)
(indicating that, under indeterminate sentencing, "crime is seen as a disease to be
cured"). For a critical analysis of the medical approach to criminal punishment, see
generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON

(Alan Sheridan trans., 1977).
30. Charlton T. Lewis, The Indeterminate Sentence, 9 YALE L.J. 17, 22, 28
(1899).
31. Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 125.
32. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978); see also Nagel, supra note
6, at 893-94 ("So long as reformation was the principal goal of imprisonment, it was
reasoned that the prisoner should be sentenced until he or she had reformed ... ").
33. Nagel, supra note 6, at 894; see also Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 128 ("By
1922, 37 states had similar forms of indeterminate sentencing.").
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 2031.
35. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat.
922 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1970)).
36. Herman, supra note 19.
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relevant." 37 Following a guilty verdict at trial, the judge would hear
arguments from each side on an appropriate punishment for the
defendant, after which he or she would announce his or her decision.
Procedural protections at these occasions were basically nonexistent:
"There was no limitation on either the type or quality of information
a judge could consider at sentencing. Moreover, none of this
information was subject to filtering by the rules of evidence, and the
judge was required to make no findings of fact."38 Despite concerns
about the fairness of this approach, the Supreme Court signed off on
it in its 1949 Williams v. New York decision, 39 emphasizing the
rehabilitative purpose of criminal punishment and explaining that it
was "[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-to [the] selection of an
appropriate sentence . .

information possible
characteristics.40

.

" that the judge obtain "the fullest

concerning

the

defendant's

life

and

C. The Guidelines Era:Determinate-GuidelinesSentencing
After a century of dominance, 4 1 indeterminate sentencing gave
way in the 1970s and 1980s, replaced across the country-most
notably at the federal level-by "determinate-guidelines" systems.
Sentencing guidelines reflected a return to determinate punishment,
but they provided more precision than the old colonial approach by
scoring the seriousness of each individual defendant's offense and
then translating that score into a specific prison term. 42
In the early 1970s, opponents of indeterminate sentencing, most
notably Judge Marvin Frankel of the Southern District of New York,
started to speak out against the country's system of punishment and

37. Id. at 303; see also Grayson, 438 U.S. at 48 ("Indeterminate sentencing
under the rehabilitation model presented sentencing judges with a serious practical
problem: how rationally to make the required predictions so as to avoid capricious
and arbitrary sentences, which the newly conferred and broad discretion placed
within the realm of possibility. An obvious, although only partial, solution was to
provide the judge with as much information as reasonably practical concerning the
defendant's

'character

and

propensities[,]

.

.

.

his

present

purposes

and

tendencies,'... and, indeed, 'every aspect of [his] life."' (quoting Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55
(1937)).
38. Bowman, supra note 23.
39. 337 U.S. 241.
40. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
41. See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 128.
42. See Berman, supra note 29, at 393-96; Douglas A. Berman,
Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 8-11 (2005); Bowman, supra
note 23, at 1325.
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called for a new, guidelines-based approach. 43 They highlighted
three problems with indeterminate sentencing in particular. First,
indeterminate-sentencing schemes lacked in transparency and
accountability. Judges were not required to make findings of fact or
to explain the reasons for why they chose the sentences that they
did. Their decisions were practically unreviewable on appeal. 44 A
guidelines-based system, it was hoped, would bring structure,
45
clarity, and predictability to this otherwise "lawless" system.
46
Second, the medical model of criminal justice had lost credibility.
Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggested that prisons were not
47
reforming most offenders; meanwhile, crime rates were rising.
Practitioners, commentators, and the public no longer believed in

43. Judge Frankel's 1972 book, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, was
the inspiration for federal sentencing reform as well as the creation of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. See FRANKEL, supra note 1; Kate Stith & Steve Y.
Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228-30 (1993); Dershowitz,
supra note 1, at 131.
44. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 17-25, 39-49, 76, 81-82; Bowman, supra
note 23, at 1322-23. Judge Frankel recounted the following memory as a particularly
chilling example of the consequences of this lack of transparency:
One story concerns a casual anecdote over cocktails in a rare conversation
among judges touching the subject of sentencing. Judge X . . . told of a
defendant for whom the judge, after reading the presentence report, had
decided tentatively upon a sentence of four years' imprisonment. At the
sentencing hearing in the courtroom, after hearing counsel, Judge X invited
the defendant to exercise his right to address the court in his own behalf.
The defendant took a sheaf of papers from his pocket and proceeded to read
from them, excoriating the judge, the "kangaroo court" in which he'd been
tried, and the legal establishment in general. Completing the story, Judge X
said, "I listened without interrupting. Finally, when he said he was
through, I simply gave the son of a bitch five years instead of the four."...
Would we tolerate an act of Congress penalizing such an outburst by a year
in prison? The question, however rhetorical, misses one truly exquisite note
of agony: that the wretch sentenced by Judge X never knew, because he was
never told, how the fifth year of his term came to be added.
FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 18-19.
45. Frankel & Orland, supra note 29, at 232.
46. Relatedly, many wondered whether trial judges--educated in law, not the
behavioral sciences-really had the expertise necessary to decide just how long a
criminal should spend in prison in order to become rehabilitated. See FRANKEL,
supra note 1, at 3-25, 86-124.
47. See id. at 89-102; Bowman, supra note 23, at 1322-23; Nagel, supra note 6,
at 895-97; Stith & Koh, supra note 43, at 227.
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the rehabilitative project of the criminal law, 48 which had formed the
theoretical foundation for the indeterminate approach. Finally, and
most importantly, there was a growing body of evidence revealing
that sentencing outcomes often varied significantly depending on the
identity of the sentencing judge. 49 Particularly disturbing were
studies linking sentencing disparities to the offender's race, gender,
and socioeconomic status. 50 Binding guidelines, it was thought, could
end such disparities by ensuring that like cases were treated
equally.
Just as before, states across the nation, as well as the federal
government, quickly amended their laws to implement the new
approach. This was a "true 'sentencing revolution,"' as Douglas
Berman has described it, "in which the highly-discretionary
indeterminate sentencing systems that had been dominant for
nearly a century . . . " was replaced by an "array of sentencing

structures that now govern[ed] sentencing decision-making and
shape[d] sentencing outcomes." 5 1 The most significant development
was at the federal level.5 2 In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act, which abolished indeterminate sentencing in the federal
courts and created a new government agency-the United States
Sentencing Commission-to promulgate mandatory guidelines that
would restrict the discretion of district court judges when they
imposed punishments on criminal offenders.5 3 By the year 2000,

48. Judge Frankel opined:
We sentence many people every day who are not "sick" in any identifiable
respect and are certainly not candidates for any form of therapy or
"rehabilitation" known thus far ....
This is a group who, as nearly as
anyone can perceive, are not driven by, or "acting out," neurotic or psychotic
impulses. Instead, they have coldly and deliberately figured the odds, risked
punishment for rewards large enough (in their view) to justify the risk, but
then had the misfortune to be caught.
FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 90.

49. See id. at 6-11, 21-25; Berman, supra note 29, at 393; Nagel, supra note 6,
at 895-97.
50. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 6-11, 21-25; Berman, supra note 29, at 393;
Nagel, supra note 6, at 895-97.
51. Berman, supra note 29, at 395.
52. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 1318, 1320 ('The federal government has
been a leader ...

in its embrace of structured sentencing ....

As the largest and only

national sentencing regime, the federal system inevitably acts as a model, both
positive and negative, for developments in the states.").
53. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000)).
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the United States had enacted a
practically every jurisdiction in
54
determinate-guidelines scheme.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines-first published by the
Sentencing Commission in 1987 and updated every year since-offer
a useful example of how determinate-guidelines sentencing worked
in practice. The easiest way to understand the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines is to start at the finish line. 55 The Guidelines are, in

essence, "nothing more than a big set of instructions for one
particular chart-the Sentencing Table." 56 The Sentencing Table

compares two different numbers across its x- and y-axes-the
"offense level" (a measure of the seriousness of the crime at issue)
and the "criminal history category" (a measure of the defendant's
past wrongdoing). 57 The intersection of these two figures yields a
recommended prison term, which, at the time Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act, was intended to bind the district court
58
judge.
To calculate the "offense level," the Guidelines assign each type
of crime a default number called a "base offense level." Aggravated
assault, for example, has a base offense level of 14.59 The Guidelines
then instruct that the sentencing judge should adjust the base level
by applying a series of rules that tie various increases and decreases
to the offense level to account for the unique circumstances of each
case. If the offender brandished a weapon when he committed the
crime, for example, his or her offense level would increase by three.60
The offense level would decrease by two, by contrast, if the
defendant was only a minor participant in the offense. 61 Each
upward and downward change to the defendant's offense level
requires a factual finding on the record, which the sentencing judge
hearing. Possible offense levels range
makes after an evidentiary
62
from one to forty-three.
To determine the "criminal history category," the Guidelines
assign a set number of points for each previous prison sentence the
offender has served-two points for each sentence of at least sixty

54.

See Berman, supra note 29, at 394; see also NoRAH DEMLEITNER, ET AL.,

SENTENCING LAw AND POLICY: CASES, STATUTES, AND GUIDELINES 147 (2d ed. 2007).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

COMM'N
60.
61.
62.

See Bowman, supra note 1, at 693.
Id.
See id. at 695-97.
See id. at 700.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2(a) (U.S. SENTENCING
2014).
See id. § 2A2.2(2)(C).
See id. § 3B1.2(b).
Id. ch. 1, pt. A(h).
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days, three points for a prior sentence exceeding one year and one
month, and so on. 63 The Guidelines also add points if the defendant
committed the offense at issue while he was under the supervision of
64
the criminal justice system-for instance, if he was on probation.
The offender's total criminal history points are then translated into a
criminal history category, which ranges from I (one) to VI (six).65
Once these calculations are complete, the judge takes the
resulting numbers and compares them against one another on the
Guidelines' "Sentencing Table," which yields a recommended prison
sentence for the case. This recommendation comprises an extremely
narrow range of possible prison terms in contrast to the broad
statutory range. 66 An offense level of five and a criminal history
category of II, for instance, would result in a recommended sentence
of zero to six months imprisonment. 67 An offense level of thirty-nine
and a criminal history category of III would yield a recommendation
68
of 324 to 405 months (27 to 33.75 years in prison).
When Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, the sentence
recommended by the Guidelines was intended to bind the district
court judge, requiring him or her to choose a sentence within the
narrow range provided. 69 The Act specified only three circumstances
in
which the judge
could depart from the Guidelines'
recommendation. First, the judge could reject the Guidelines if the
case featured "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission . . . that should [have] result[ed] in a
sentence different from that described." 70 Second, the judge could
depart if the offender's "criminal history category substantially
under-represent[ed] . . . [or] substantially over-represent[ed] the
seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood [of

63.

See id. § 4Al.1(a)-(c).

64. See id. § 4A1.l(d).
65. See id. ch. 5, pt. A.
66. As directed by the Sentencing Reform Act, the maximum recommended
term under the Guidelines could not exceed the minimum term by more than twentyfive percent or six months, whichever was greater. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).
67. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
68. See id.
69. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014) (allowing the sentencing
court to depart from the Guidelines range if it finds that § 3553(b) aggravating or
mitigating circumstances exist). The Guidelines specifically exclude many factors
from departure consideration. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5,
pt. H (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
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recidivism.]"7 1 Third, and finally, the judge could impose a more
lenient sentence if the defendant had provided "substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
ha[d] committed an offense." 72 The district judge's calculation of the
Guidelines' sentence, and any decision to depart from that
recommendation, was made reviewable de novo on appeal.7 3 In 2003,
Congress made it even more difficult for judges to depart from the
Guidelines' recommendations by raising the standard of appellate
review for such decisions and ordering the Sentencing Commission
to amend the Guidelines to "substantially reduce" the departure
4
rate.7
Almost as soon as state and federal guidelines were enacted,
critics complained that they were too severe, too rigid, too
complicated, and too impersonal.7 5 Yet, up to the end of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld guidelines'
systems against constitutional attack. 76 Determinate sentencing, in
the form of binding guidelines, had returned. It seemed that it was
here to stay.
D. The Post-Booker Era: Hybrid Sentencing
At the beginning of the new millennium, the Supreme Court
issued a series of three opinions that transformed American
sentencing policy once again, most notably at the federal level,
where the Court effectively invented a new, hybrid sentencing
regime. Culminating in its landmark 2005 United States v. Booker
decision, the Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines
could advise, but could not bind, district court judges, thus injecting

71. See id. § 4A1.3(a)(1), (b)(1).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(n) (Supp. 2004).
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000).
74. See PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d)(1)-(2), 117 Stat.
650, 670 (2003) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)).
75. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea
for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 922 (1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of
Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1703 (1992); Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1949; Kate
Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (1997); Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Cure Worse Than the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 905 (1992).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989); see also Berman, supra note 42, at 8, 15-24
(describing the process by which the Court "through the 1980s and 1990s continued
to sanction an administrative model of sentencing decision-making").
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an element of indeterminacy into determinate-guidelines sentencing
77
and creating a hybrid system of punishment.
The two decisions that laid the groundwork for Booker were
Apprendi v. New Jersey78 and Blakely v. Washington.79 In Apprendi,
the Court struck down a New Jersey statute that empowered state
judges to increase the statutory maximum for a crime if they found
that the offender had been motivated by racial animus8 0 The
Apprendi majority based its decision on the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial and stated the holding simply: "Other than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."8' In Blakely, the Court
confronted a similar statute from Washington State, which allowed
judges to sentence above the guidelines' recommendation if they
found additional facts-for instance, that the offender had acted
82
with deliberate cruelty-that justified a more severe punishment.
The Court held that this law also violated the Sixth Amendment,
thus extending the Apprendi rule from statutory maximums to
mandatory Guidelines' maximums:
[T]he "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of
the facts reflected in the jury verdict . . . . When a judge
alone does not
inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict
83
allow. ...[he] exceeds his proper authority.
The Supreme Court issued the final blow 84 to the federal
government's own determinate-guidelines' system just a year later

77. 543 U.S. 220, 233-34 (2005).
78. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
79. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
80. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
81. Id. at 490.
82. Washington, 542 U.S. at 299-300 (2004) (quoting Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
9.94A.120(2) (2000)).
83. See id. at 303-04.
84. Although the Blakely majority expressly declined to pass judgment on the
constitutionality of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, see id. at 305 n.9, Justice
O'Connor, author of the principal dissent, see id. at 314 (O'Connor, J., dissenting),
feared from the beginning that the decision was a "No. 10 earthquake." Senate,
Judges Urge 'Blakely'Redux, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 2004. As soon as Blakely came down,

it seemed clear that the United States Sentencing Guidelines would not last long in
this world. See Berman, supra note 42, at 35-38.
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in United States v. Booker,8 5 which involved a challenge to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines analogous to the one brought in
Blakely.8 6 In Booker, the defendant had been convicted of trafficking
over fifty grams of crack cocaine for which the Sentencing Guidelines
recommended a punishment of 210 to 262 months incarceration.8 7
The sentencing judge, however, found that the defendant had
actually trafficked over 600 grams of crack, thus yielding a much
higher Guidelines' recommendation of 360 months to life in prison.88
A majority of the Supreme Court, applying Apprendi and Blakely,
concluded that this violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury.8 9 As a remedy, a different majority of the Court struck and
severed the provision of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the
Guidelines mandatory, thereby rendering them "effectively
advisory." 90 "So modified, . . . " the Court explained, the Act would
"require a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, . . . "but

would also "permit[] the court to tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns." 91 On appeal, sentencing decisions would now be
92
reviewed for "reasonableness."
After Booker, federal sentencing works as follows. The district
judge must "begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating
the applicable

Guidelines range." 93 That range serves as "the

starting point and the initial benchmark" for the rest of the decisionmaking process, 94 but it is "not the only consideration." 95 The judge
must also perform "an individualized assessment" 96 of the case and
take into account "the basic sentencing objectives that the statute
sets forth in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)." 97 These additional considerations
include:

85.

543 U.S. 220 (2005).

Washington, 542 U.S. 296.
87. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227 (Stevens, J.).
88. See id. Elsewhere, I have explored the problematic relationship between
86.

drug-quantity determinations and sentencing, even under the advisory post-Booker
Guidelines. See Jacob Schuman, Probability and Punishment: How to Improve
Sentencing by Taking Account of Probability,18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 214 (2015).
89. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 229 (Stevens, J.).
90. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J.).
91. Id. at 245-46.
92. Id. at 260-62.
93. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
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(1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a
sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely (a)
"just punishment" (retribution), (b) deterrence,
(c)
incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally
available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing
Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid
98
unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution.
If the judge concludes that, in light of the factors enumerated in
§ 3553(a), the Guidelines' sentence is either too high or too low, he or
she may vary upward or downward from that recommendation, so
long as he or she remains within the prescribed statutory range. 99
The judge may give almost any reason to justify his or her decision
to vary from the Guidelines, including personally disagreeing with
the Sentencing Commission policy. 100
Although Booker gives district judges significant discretion to
depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, a number of pressures work
together to encourage them to adhere to the Commission's
recommendations. First, judges are required to "begin their analysis
with the Guidelines" and to "remain cognizant of them throughout
the sentencing process,"' 01 a practice that inevitably exerts a

psychological pull. 10 2 Next, judges must specifically justify any

decision to vary from the Guidelines' recommendation, and the more
they vary, the greater the justification they must provide. 103 Finally,
on appeal all sentences are reviewable for "reasonableness," and in
sentence is presumed
most circuits a within-Guidelines
reasonable. 0 4 As a result, the empirical evidence shows that judges

Id. at 347-48 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 I Supp. IV)).
99. See id. at 351.
100. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101,
109-10 (2007).
101. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 n.6.
102. See United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 40-41 (2d Cir. 2013); Mark W.
Bennett, Confronting Cognitive 'Anchoring Effect" and "Blind Spot" Biases in
Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 519-29 (2014).
103. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
104. See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); United States
v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706,
708 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005). But see United States v, Cooper, 437 F.3d
324, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding no presumption of reasonableness); United
States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Jimenez98.
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tend to stick to the Guidelines' recommendations: "[WIhen a
Guidelines range moves up or down, offenders' sentences move with
it."105 "In less than one-fifth of cases since 2007 have district courts
imposed above- or below-Guidelines sentences absent a Government
motion."'10 6 Indeed, just over half of all sentences handed down in
2012 followed the Guidelines' recommendation 107
After Booker, then, federal sentencing policy reflects a new,
determinate/indeterminate approach to punishment: a hybrid model.
The system is determinate insofar as it requires district judges to
calculate a recommended sentence for each case based on the
Sentencing Guidelines and then pressures them to adhere to that
recommendation.10 8 Empirical evidence, as outlined above, shows
that our sentencing system remains significantly determinate. At
the same time, however, the Supreme Court's decision in Booker
frees district judges to conduct an individualized assessment of the
facts of each case and to reject the Guidelines' recommendation if
they find it inappropriate in light of the goals of punishment set out
in § 3553(a).109 The restoration of that discretion injects a
fundamental indeterminacy into the heart of contemporary federal
sentencing practice.
II. THREE QUESTIONS OF SENTENCING POLICY:
WHO, WHAT, AND WHY?

In the real world, as I mentioned earlier, it is rare to find
sentencing systems that are entirely determinate or entirely

Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc) (same); United States v. Talley,
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (same). The Supreme Court signed
431 F.3d 784, 788 (lth
off on this practice in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
105. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2084 (2013). Indeed, in Peugh, the
Court recognized the enduring power of the Guidelines by extending defendants' ex
post facto rights to cover Guidelines amendments. See id.
106. Id.
107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FIscAL YEAR
2012 1 (2012), http://www.ussc.govfData-andStatistics/FederalSentencing_
Statistics/QuarterlySentencingUpdates/USSC_2012_QuarterReportFinal.pdf
(indicating that, out of 82,674 cases in fiscal year 2012, 52.4% resulted in a
Guidelines-range sentence). Data such as this led Frank 0. Bowman, III to declare
that "[t]he Guidelines still matter. They still matter nearly as much as they did on
the day before Booker was decided." Frank 0. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The
Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUST. L. REv. 1227,
1269 (2014).
108. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
109. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (Breyer, J.) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)).
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indeterminate. Most fall somewhere in between. 110 Debates over
punishment policy, then, often play out as a tug-of-war across the
spectrum of sentence determinacy, with reformers of each era
seeking to pull the law in one direction or the other. In today's
Booker era, the relationship between determinate and indeterminate
sentencing has become an especially important concern because the
federal government's hybrid regime requires district judges to choose
between a determinate (Guidelines) and an indeterminate (§
3553(a)) approach every time they sentence an offender.",
So far, discussions of determinate and indeterminate sentencing
have centered around three interrelated questions of sentencing
policy:
A. Who should decide punishment: legislatures or judges?
B. What makes punishment fair: uniformity or proportionality?
C. Why do we punish: retribution or rehabilitation?
In the next three sections, I explore each of these questions.
Then, in Part III, I suggest a new, fourth question for discussion:
How should we decide punishment-rules or standards? I then
explain this question's special significance under the federal
government's hybrid sentencing system.
A. Who Should Decide Punishment:Legislaturesor Judges?
The first way to think about sentence determinacy is in terms of
2
institutional choice, or rather, who should decide punishment."

110. The highly determinate regime enacted in the 1648 Lauues and Libertyes,
for example, still allowed judges some limited discretion to choose how long an
offender might spend in the stocks or how many lashes of the whip he might receive.
See Lauues and Libertyes of Massachusetts, supra note 15. Similarly, the highly
indeterminate systems that reigned in the mid-twentieth century usually set
maximum or minimum bounds on the possible sentences for each crime. Even in the
case of offenses for which the judge could choose any prison term at all, they at the
very least enumerated the types of penalty available (e.g., fines and incarceration,
not corporeal punishment). See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 943 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1970);
18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1976 ed.)).
111. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46 (Breyer, J.).
112. Many decision-makers, of course, play a role in determining sentences,
including prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and correctional
authorities. See Freed, supra note 75, at 1696. I touch on two of those decisionmakers-prosecutors and sentencing commissions-below. See infra pp. 24-25.
Legislatures and judges, however, have traditionally been the institutional actors
assigned primary authority to decide punishment. See Freed, supra note 75, at 1693
(identifying legislatures and district courts as the guiding forces behind federal
sentencing policy).
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Determinate sentencing, as Alan Dershowitz has explained, is a
"legislatively fixed" model of punishment, while indeterminate
sentencing is a "judicially fixed" model of punishment.1n 3 Because
determinate sentencing is legislatively fixed, it is more democratic,
better coordinated, and more transparent.
First, the legislature is the most representative branch of
government, which means that determinate sentences "expresso the
collective moral judgment of the community."11 4 Senator Strom
Thurmond, for example, supported the Sentencing Reform Act in
part because he hoped it would prevent over-indulgent judges from
subverting the popular will by imposing inappropriately lenient
punishments. 115 At the same time, however, making sentencing
more determinate and thus more democratic may also lead to
sentences becoming excessively punitive. Social concern about crime
is ever present, and criminal defendants have no significant lobby to
oppose voices calling for harsher sentencing policies. 116 Legislators
face powerful, ongoing public pressure to toughen the criminal law,
but very little to temper it.117 Indeed, over the past few decades,
Congress has voted again and again to make the federal criminal
code more punitive, especially for drug-related crimes (with the
notable exception of the 2010 vote to reduce the severity of crack
cocaine sentencing),118

Second, centralizing sentencing decisions in the legislature
allows determinate regimes to harmonize criminal justice policy. A
legislature that sets punishments can coordinate sentencing laws to
address systemic concerns, such as rising crime rates or overcrowded

113. Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 129.
114. Bowman, supra note 23, at 1344; see also FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 107
("[Ilt is for the legislature in our system to decide and prescribe the legitimate bases
for criminal sanctions.").
115. See Stith & Koh, supra note 43, at 261-62.
116. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)
CriminalLaw, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 25 (1997).
117. See Alschuler, supra note 75, at 934; Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring
(and Again Timely) Wisdom of the OriginalMPC Sentencing Provisions, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 709, 717-18 (2009); Bowman, supra note 23, at 1318, 1344; Eric. S. Fish,
Sentencing and Interbranch Dialogue, 105 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 21), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2496724.
118. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 47-58 (2012); WILLIAM J. STuNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF

AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 251-74 (2011). But see The Fair Sentencing Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2-3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).
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prisons. 119 It can also impose a "consistent sentencing philosophy
across the entire jurisdiction" 120 Realistically, of course, modern
legislatures have neither the time nor the expertise to spell out an
appropriate punishment for every possible offense.12 1 Although not
so difficult in colonial days, in the modern age it would be a
massive-if not impossible- undertaking for legislators to spell out
an entirely determinate sentencing regime. Thus, legislatures
inevitably have to delegate at least some of their power to decide
22
sentences.1
Finally, legislatively announced punishments make determinate
systems more predictable and transparent. Because the legislature
sets each punishment by statute, every convicted defendant knows
what to expect when he or she walks into a courtroom for
sentencing.123 When fixed punishments are enacted into law,
moreover, the public has a measure by which to evaluate the
performance of criminal justice policymakers and can more easily
124
debate, improve, and implement new sentencing policies.
Predetermined punishments, however, also make it harder to do
justice in individual cases, as I will show below.
Indeterminate sentencing, by contrast, is judicially fixed, which
makes it more professional, more individualized, and more human.
First, because judges enjoy greater political independence than
legislators, indeterminate sentences reflect more detached, objective
judgments. Judges are not subject to the same pressure as
legislators to increase prison terms or crack down on unpopular
defendants, and they gain experience in criminal punishment
throughout their careers, which they can apply in order to sentence

119. Cf. Fish, supra note 117 (manuscript at 26) ("The main disadvantage of
granting judges sentencing discretion is that they are unable to effectively coordinate
with one another.").
120. Id. (manuscript at 28); cf. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 6 (criticizing
indeterminate sentencing because "a defendant who comes up for sentencing has no
way of knowing or reliably predicting whether he will walk out of the courtroom on
probation, or be locked up for a term of years that may consume the rest of his life, or
something in between").
121. Fish, supra note 117 (manuscript at 20).
122. Id.
123. See Dershowitz, supra note 1, at 129 (noting that, for legislatively fixed
sentences, "the sentence is determined in advance of the crime and without knowing
who the criminal is").
124. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 1346-47 (noting that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's "ongoing work in gathering and disseminating data has made
informed discussion about [the sentencing] factors possible"); see also Bowman, supra
note 1, at 720 ("The Guidelines let light into the black box of sentencing.").
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more effectively. 125 At the same time, however, the power to decide
punishment is a fearsome one to vest in a single individual. Judge
Frankel condemned "the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping
powers .. .give[n] to judges" under indeterminate regimes, decrying
such discretion as "terrifying and intolerable for a society that
professes devotion to the rule of law." 126 Judicially fixed sentences,
furthermore, often result in disparities between different judges who
hold different visions of the criminal law, or who harbor racial,
gender, or class prejudices against particular defendants. 127
Second, judicially determined punishment enables a case-by-case
approach to sentencing, under which the judge selects an
appropriate sentence for each individual offender. While determinate
sentencing requires the legislature to create "a comprehensive
framework [for punishment] all at once," indeterminate sentencing
allows the judge to consider the particular circumstances of every
situation, one at a time. 128 This means that judges can take into
account all the relevant facts of each case, which may include new
details-such as an aggravating feature of the crime or a mitigating
factor drawn from considering the offender's background-that the
legislature would not have foreseen. 129 Furthermore, because judges
interact with the parties in each case, they are "better placed than
other actors to observe the defendant and make a decision about the
wrongfulness of their actions and their likelihood of reoffending."130
This approach, however, also makes it more difficult to obtain
system-wide agreement on certain basic questions of sentencing
policy. Leaving each judge to decide on his or her own, for example,
what factors should increase or decrease sentences or what the
actual purpose of punishment is, may lead to an inconsistent, if not
arbitrary, system of criminal justice. 131

125. Fish, supra note 117 (manuscript at 24). But see FRANKEL, supra note 1,at
12-14 (decrying judges' lack of attentiveness to sentencing both before and after
taking the bench).
126. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 5.
127. Id. at 6. As Judge Frankel explained, "It is not self-evident that the fleshand-blood judge coming (say) from among the white middle classes will inevitably
achieve admirable results when he individualizes the narcotics sentences of the
suburban college youth and the street-wise young ghetto hustler." Id. at 10.
128. Fish, supra note 117 (manuscript at 24). The Supreme Court invoked
judges' need to consider a wide variety of facts related to each case under an
indeterminate regime in order to justify the more lax procedural protections at
sentencing. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-50 (1949).
129. See Fish, supra note 117 (manuscript at 24).
130. Id.
131. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 25, 107.
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Finally, judges put a "human face o[n] justice." 132 When judges
impose punishment, the process takes "the form of a face-to-face
encounter between individuals," communicating to the condemned
and to the public that the decision is a moral and weighty one, not
merely a dry administrative calculus. 133 This encounter may have an
impact on the judge as well, since "[ijmposing a term of
imprisonment on a specific individual standing before you is very
different from deciding sentence lengths for certain fact patterns in
the abstract."134 Judicial sentencing thus enhances the moral
legitimacy of the law.135 Skeptics of this argument, however, contend
that the abstract moral benefits of indeterminate sentencing are
1 36
outweighed by its concrete costs of irrationality and inconsistency.
Two final institutional actors bear mentioning in the discussion
of sentence determinacy and institutional choice: sentencing
commissions and prosecutors.
Sentencing commissions-government agencies charged with
researching and publishing sentencing guidelines-are a key feature
of determinate guidelines systems. They are intended to solve two of
the problems associated with more traditional, legislatively
prescribed determinate schemes. 137 First, sentencing commissions
are, in theory, more politically insulated than legislatures and thus
may not feel the same public pressure to ramp up punishments
beyond what is necessary to control crime. 138 Second, sentencing
commissions have both the time and the experience necessary to
enumerate a comprehensive determinate regime and improve it over
time. 139 Whether sentencing commissions have actually fulfilled
140
these two purposes, however, is the subject of ongoing debate.
Prosecutors, too, are significant players in deciding sentences.
Traditionally, prosecutors have the sole power to decide which
charges to bring (or to drop) against a defendant. 141 Under

132.

Stith

&

Cabranes, supra note 75, at 1253; see also Fish, supra note 117

(manuscript at 25) ("[J]udges also provide human face to punishment.").
133. Stith & Cabranes, supra note 75, at 1253, 1263.
134. Fish, supra note 117 (manuscript at 25).
135. See id.
136. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 711-12.
137. Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal
System, 43 HOUST. L. REV. 341, 376-78 (2006).
138. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 1324.
139. See id.; Fish, supra note 117 (manuscript at 28-29).
140. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 137, at 378 (criticizing the U.S. Sentencing
Commission for failing to fulfill its purpose); Bowman, supra note 23, at 1341-46
(placing most of the blame instead on Congress).
141. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 1336.
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determinate regimes, then, prosecutors can control the punishment
that a convicted defendant will face by adding or dropping charges in
order to raise or lower the applicable penalty.14 2 Determinate
guidelines systems, similarly, allow prosecutors to influence
punishment outcomes by asking for upward sentence adjustments
or, conversely, by conceding downward ones. 143 As "masters of the
facts," moreover, prosecutors may also leave out (or deemphasize)
damaging evidence that would trigger increased punishments.144
The criminal law's increasing severity along with the generally lax
rules regarding plea agreements have further augmented
prosecutorial power. Prosecutors can now threaten to seek
significant sentence enhancements unless a defendant accepts a plea
deal that restricts what remains of the judge's sentencing
discretion. 145 Alas, unlike legislatively or judicially-fixed sentences,
prosecutors' decisions take place behind closed doors, making them
146
even more vulnerable to disparity and bias.

142. See id.; Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A StructuralCritique of the
Sentencing Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 365 (2005).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Cobbins, 749 F. Supp. 1450, 1458 (E.D. La. 1990)
(holding that a prosecutor's exercise of discretion in influencing sentencing did not
violate a defendant's due process rights); Bowman, supra note 23, at 1337; Gardina,
supra note 142, at 369. But see Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal
Sentencing: Beyond the Criticism, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1574, 1591-92 (1997) ("[T]he
argument that the Guidelines provide prosecutors with an inordinate amount of
discretion ...

is limited.").

144. Bowman, supra note 23, at 1336; see also Gardina, supra note 142, at 36768 (explaining "fact bargaining" as when "[t]he prosecutor and defendant stipulate to
a factual scenario different from reality to control not only the sentencing range but
the applicable mandatory minimum"). By charging one defendant with first-degree
murder, for example, and another with the lesser crime of manslaughter, the
prosecutor will have determined which of the two will suffer the harsher
consequence.
145. See Freed, supra note 75, at 1696-97. As Albert W. Aschuler puts it:
The sentencing commission plays the role of the "bad cop," threatening the
accused with harsh treatment. The prosecutor, the "good cop," then agrees
to protect the defendant, but only if he or she abandons the right to trial.
Substantial sentencing discretion remains except for those defendants who
claim the right to their day in court.
Alschuler, supra note 75, at 928.
146. See Freed, supra note 75, at 1723-24.
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B. What Makes Punishment Fair: Uniformity or Proportionality?
The second way to think about sentence determinacy is in terms
of justice, or what makes punishment fair. As then-Circuit Judge
Breyer explained, every sentencing system must choose between
"two competing goals[:] . . . uniformity and proportionality."147

Determinate sentencing ensures uniform punishment, while
indeterminate sentencing ensures proportionate punishment. No
sentencing system, however, can fully achieve both goals
simultaneously.

148

The more determinate a sentencing system is, the more uniform
its punishments will be, meaning that similar crimes will be more
likely to receive similar penalties. 149 Determinate systems ensure
that offenders who commit the same violation receive the same
punishment by "group[ing] offenders into like categories according to
the offense for which they were convicted" and then "prescrib[ing]
like sentences for these allegedly like groups." 15 0 A determinate
regime, for example, might require that all first-degree murder be
punished by death, thus ensuring that all murderers receive the
same treatment-execution-without regard to the identity of the
sentencing judge or the defendants' race, gender, and class. 15 1
Indeed, sentencing reformers in the 1970s pushed for a more
determinate system chiefly due to the lack of uniformity that defined
the old indeterminate system.1 52 The Sentencing Reform Act, in
particular, singled out inconsistency in criminal punishment as one

147. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentences Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 13 (1988); see also Rita
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007) ("The Guidelines commentary explains
how, despite considerable disagreement within the criminal justice community, the
Commission has gone about writing Guidelines that it intends to embody these ends.
It says, for example, that the goals of uniformity and proportionality often conflict.
The commentary describes the difficulties involved in developing a practical
sentencing system that sensibly reconciles the two ends.").
148. See Nagel, supra note 6, at 932 ("[T]he Sentencing Reform Act envisioned
guidelines sensitive to concerns for both uniformity and proportionality. Attempts to
maximize one goal may sometimes compromise the other."); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, not Disparity,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 836-37 (1992).
149. See Breyer, supra note 147, at 13.
150. Nagel, supra note 6, at 933.
151. Systemic disparities might still persist, however, due to the discretion
remaining in other criminal justice actors, such as the police and the prosecutors. See
Berman, supra note 42, at 46-47 (noting that uniformity is likely to always be an
elusive goal because of the overlapping discretion of other actors).
152. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 21.
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of its primary concerns, 153 and

modern-day reformers

remain

154
devoted to the ideal of uniformity.
The more indeterminate a sentencing system is, by contrast, the
more proportionate its sentences will be, meaning that each offender
will be more likely to receive an appropriately severe penalty. 155 By
giving judges the discretion to select punishments based on the
unique facts of each case, 156 indeterminate systems ensure that
offenders who commit a more serious crime receive a more serious
punishment and vice versa. An indeterminate regime, for example,
might provide that a bank-robber be punished with a prison
sentence between zero and twenty years, thus ensuring that each
individual bank-robber receives a punishment as harsh or as lenient
as he deserves. In every case, the sentencing judge would take all
the circumstances into account, distinguishing between more or less
culpable bank robbers and assigning each a corresponding sentence.
Indeed, when the Supreme Court upheld New York's indeterminate
sentencing scheme against constitutional attack in Williams v. New
York. The Court praised the flexibility of the approach, contrasting it
with the excessively uniform nature of the old, determinate model:
"The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal

153. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 11 (2004), www.ussc.gov/sites/

default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscalane
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
ous/15-year-study/15_yearstudyfull.pdf;
(designating "sentenc[ing] disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar conduct" as a factor to be considered by the court
during sentencing); Breyer, supra note 147, at 4-5 (identifying Congress' purpose as
"reduc[ing] 'unjustifiably wide' sentencing disparity"); Nagel, supra note 6, at 883
(recognizing disparity as one of three primary purposes of the Sentencing Reform
Act); Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1944, 1944 n.38 (explaining that "[t]he
most frequent criticism" of indeterminate sentencing was the "disparate treatment
[ofi similarly situated individuals"); Stith & Koh, supra note 43, at 227-28 (stating
that "disparity in the sentences received by persons who had committed the same
crime" was a criticism of indeterminate sentencing). The statute's requirement that
the maximum of each recommended guideline range not exceed the minimum by
more than twenty-five percent reflects "the tolerable level of disparity acceptable to
Congress." Nagel, supra note 6, at 933; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).
154. See Berman, supra note 42, at 46.
155. Cf. Nagel, supra note 6, at 932 (stating that "[a] central purpose for the
passage of the Sentencing Reform Act was to reduce unwarranted disparity among
defendants with similar records convicted of similar criminal conduct, and to
increase uniformity, certainty, and fairness").
156. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 682-83 ("There was no limitation on either
the type or quality of information a judge could consider at sentencing.").
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category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past
life and habits of a particular offender. This whole country has
traveled far from the period in which the death sentence was an
automatic and commonplace result of convictions."' 157
The sentencing goals of uniformity and proportionality are
fundamentally irreconcilable.
The uniformity provided by
determinate sentencing, for instance, comes at the cost of
proportionality. When determinate systems group offenders into
abstract categories based on their crimes, they also inevitably "lump
together cases which, in punitive terms, should be treated
differently.15s As Michael Tonry has explained, "[r]igid sentencing
laws ...

create unacceptable risks of injustice because they make it

impossible to take account of important differences between
defendants."'159 Imagine, for example, a law mandating that all
defendants convicted of bank robbery receive a ten-year prison
sentence. Such a law would ensure that bank robbers receive
uniform punishments--every robber gets ten years in prison-but it
would also subject a less culpable robber (one who, say, used a toy
gun and caused no injuries) to the exact same punishment as a more
culpable robber (one who used a machine gun and seriously injured
three people). The ten-year sentence, as a result, would either
overpunish the less-culpable robber or fail to sufficiently punish the
more culpable one, depending on what one believes about how to
punish robbery. Either way, "proportionality [wiould be
6
compromised by overreaching uniformity."1 0
The proportionality provided by indeterminate sentencing,
conversely, comes at the cost of uniformity. When indeterminate
systems give judges the discretion to select punishments on a caseby-case basis, similar cases inevitably receive dissimilar sentences,
depending on each individual judge's perspectives on sentencing
philosophy, views on what sentencing factors are relevant or
irrelevant, and race, gender, or class biases. 16 1 Indeed, Frank 0.
Bowman, III derides as "utopian" the notion that "a single human
judge can make rational and consistent choices that take account [of
appropriate sentencing factors while] .

.

. exclud[ing others]," and at

the same time, "with neither central guidance nor collective
consultation, be acceptably consistent with the choices of hundreds

157. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (indicating that the SRA
attempted to balance the determinate goal of uniformity with the indeterminate goal
of "set[ting] sentences that constitute just punishment for the offense").
158. Breyer, supranote 147, at 13.
159. MICHAEL ToNRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 7 (1996).
160. Nagel, supra note 6, at 935.
161.

See FRANKEL, supranote 1, at 21.
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of fellow judges making their solitary decisions."'162 The Senate
Judiciary Committee, when it considered the Sentencing Reform Act,
similarly concluded that sentencing disparity under the old
indeterminate system could be "traced directly to the unfettered
discretion the law confers on those judges . . . responsible for
imposing ... the sentence."'163 "[Trying to individualize sentences,"

164
in short, "inevitably results in disparity."
Even a determinate guidelines system, which adds a significant
degree of precision to determinate sentencing, will still suffer from a
lack of proportionality. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines attempt
to tailor each recommended sentence to each offender by
enumerating a variety of sentence enhancements and reductions
based on the specific circumstances of each case. 16 5 The robbery
guideline, for example, increases the defendant's offense level if he

used a weapon or injured a victim. 166 The resulting sentence,

accordingly, will be more proportionate than if all bank robbers
received the exact same punishment. But this approach only goes so
far. Because "the number of possible relevant distinctions [between
two crimes] is endless,"'167 picking out a few distinctions as solely
determinative of punishment necessarily means overlooking
others. 168 Ilene Nagel explains:
One could easily accomplish uniformity by sentencing all
offenders convicted of bank robbery to the same sentence.
However, some bank robbers may have used a gun, a knife, a
club, or a simulated weapon; some may have taken hostages
who they restrained and beat, others may have taken
hostages without violence, while still others may not have
taken any hostages; some robberies may have involved the
use of masks, getaway cars, maps, or lookouts, while others
may have been committed by lone offenders in a rather

162. Bowman, supra note 1, at 711-12.
163. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983).
164. Bowman, supra note 1, at 708.
165. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236 (2005) (Stevens, J.)
(describing the increasing number and severity of Guidelines enhancements).
166. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1(2)-(3) (2014).
167. Breyer, supra note 147.

168. Indeed, scholars have criticized the federal Guidelines on precisely these
grounds. See Alschuler, supra note 75, at 917 ("[Tlhis regime may have come closer
to treating all offenders who committed the same crimes alike, but it may not have
Indeed,
been as successful in treating offenders of comparable culpability alike ....
when the guidelines rest on nonsense standards (as . . . some of them do), it may be

the judges of the older regime who treated offenders more equally.").
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spontaneous, unplanned manner; some robbers may have
taken $10,000, some $50,000, and some $5,000,000.169
Even under a guidelines system that differentiates between all
these situations, one could still dream up other possibly relevant
distinctions between two bank robberies, such as "whether the
defendant robbed other banks during the recent period." 170 Unless
the guidelines include an infinite list of enhancements or reductions,
they will invariably result in the occasional unjust sentence. 171 It is
no surprise, then, that critics of the pre-Booker, mandatory federal
Guidelines highlighted the irrational outcomes they produced,
complaining that the severity of the recommended sentence did not
always correlate with the offender's culpability.172
As a determinate guidelines scheme becomes more precise,
moreover, it begins to lose in uniformity what it gains in
proportionality. Every additional distinguishing factor included in a
guidelines system not only makes the system less manageable, but
also provides another opportunity for judges (and prosecutors) to
exercise their discretion in ways that lead to disparate outcomes. 173
A judge, for example, might apply a sentence enhancement to one
offender but not another or might generally be more or less willing to
apply sentence enhancements than another judge. Every additional
sentencing factor, in other words, effectively makes the sentencing
system more indeterminate, which, as explained above, also makes it
more vulnerable to disparity. 174 Indeed, critics of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines have expressed concern about the complexity
of the system for precisely this reason. 175 Accordingly, although the

169. Nagel, supra note 6, at 934-35.
170. Id. at 935; see also Breyer, supra note 147, at 13 ("[T]he proportionality goal
seeks to approach each of the myriad bank robbery scenarios from varying
sentencing perspectives. The more the system recognizes the tendency to treat
different cases differently, however, the less manageable the sentencing system
becomes.").
171. See Fish, supra note 117, (manuscript at 30-31) ("[M]any defendants will
end up with unfair sentences because their particular aggravating or mitigating
circumstances were not, and could not have been contemplated ....
172. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 75, at 918-24.
173. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 1336-40; Breyer, supra note 147, at 13-14.
174. The provision for judicial departure from the Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b)(1) & (n), of course, only further exacerbates this problem. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 106-07 (2005) (describing a five percent increase in
downward departures from 1995 to 2001); Nagel, supra note 6, at 938-39.
175. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 1340.
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Sentencing Reform Act lists proportionality as one of its goals, 176
Judge Breyer, then a circuit judge, recalled that the Sentencing
Commission ultimately decided to prioritize uniformity as its
primary objective. 17 7 Whether or not the Commission has succeeded
178
in that effort, however, remains an open question.
C. Why Do We Punish: Retribution or Rehabilitation?
The third and final issue commonly discussed in relation to
sentence determinacy is that of purpose, or why we impose
punishment on criminal wrongdoers. Determinate sentencing is
traditionally associated with a retributive theory of punishment,
while indeterminate sentencing reflects a rehabilitative justification
for punishing wrongdoers.
Determinate sentencing suits the retributive justification for
179
punishment, since both employ an offense-based analysis of crime.
The retributive theory of punishment, also known as "just deserts,"
is "a backward-looking perspective focus[ed] on the moral duty to
punish past wrongdoing."'180 Retributivists focus primarily on the
blameworthiness of an offense when they apportion punishment;
they are less concerned with other factors, such as the social context
of the criminal act or any mitigating circumstances unique to the
offender. 181 Because determinate regimes set sentences in advance,
they similarly tend to tie punishments to the general elements of
each crime--considerations that are easier to describe in the
abstract, rather than the individual characteristics of the offender,
which are harder to predict and articulate. 182 Indeed, the link

176. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
177. See Breyer, supra note 147, at 13-14. Justice Breyer explains,
"Punishment, as the Commission came to see, is more of a blunderbuss than a laser
beam." Id. at 14.
178. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 1326-27.
179. See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender
Characteristicsin Modern Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 280-85 (2005);
Berman, supra note 29, at 395-96; Andrew von Hirsh, Guidance by Numbers or
Words? Numerical Versus Narrative Guidelines for Sentencing, in SENTENCING
REFORM: GUIDANCE OR GUIDELINES? 46, 49 (Martin Wasik and Ken Pease, eds.,
1987).
180. Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. L. REV.
815, 818 (2008).
181. See Nagel, supra note 6, at 898; von Hirsh, supra note 179.
182. See Berman, supra note 117, at 718; see also Alschuler, supra note 174, at
92-93 ("Describing in general terms the appropriate influence of situational and
personal characteristics on sentences is often impossible. Quantifying harms,
however, seems easy. Just count the stolen dollars and weigh the drugs.").
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between determinate sentencing and retributivism dates back at
least to Mosaic law, where violations of the codes of behavior
reflected an affront to God and were prescribed corresponding
18 3
punishments.
Indeterminate sentencing, by contrast, was "founded upon" the
rehabilitative theory of punishment, since both reflect an offenderbased analysis of crime. 184 The rehabilitative approach to
punishment, also known as the "medical model,"'1

perspective 186

5

embodies a

that seeks to reform criminals
"forward-looking"
"through a combination of deterrence motivated by the unpleasant
experience of incarceration, and personal renewal spurred by
counseling, drug treatment, job training and the like."'1 87 Proponents
of rehabilitation focus on the offender when they decide sentences,
"almost like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical
judgment."'8 8 They take into account each defendant's unique
background and needs in order to select a punishment that is most
likely to help him reform. 189 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
expressly linked indeterminate sentencing to the rehabilitative
theory of punishment: "A fundamental proposal of th[e
rehabilitative] movement [i]s a flexible sentencing system permitting
judges ... to set the release date of prisoners according to informed
judgments concerning their potential for, or actual, rehabilitation
and their likely recidivism."'' 90 It is no surprise, then, that

183. See Nagel, supra note 6, at 887-88. Indeed, the 1648 Lauues and Libertyes
of Massachusetts's provisions on sentencing cite repeatedly to Old Testament codes.
See Lauues and Libertyes of Massachusetts, supra note 15.
184. Nagel, supra note 6, at 894.
185. Bowman, supra note 1, at 684.
186. Nagel, supra note 6, at 898.
187. Bowman, supra note 1, at 685.
188. Berman, supra note 42, at 4.
189. Id. at 3, 4; see also Bowman, supra note 1, at 684-85. ("[T]he precise
combination of punitive and reinforcing measures which w[ill] maximize the chances
of rehabilitation presumably var[y) from person to person," so the judge must have
access to "the widest possible array of information about every defendant" and the
widest possible range of punishments from which to select.).
190. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978). In Williams v. New York,
the Supreme Court gave the constitutional seal-of-approval to indeterminate
sentencing precisely because of its link to the "[r]eformation and rehabilitation of
offenders," emphasizing that "the modern philosophy of penology [holds] that the
punishment should fit the offender, and not merely the crime." See 337 U.S. 241,
247-48 (1949); see also Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) ("It is
necessary to individualize each case, to give that careful, humane and comprehensive
consideration to the particular situation of each offender which would be possible
only in the exercise of a broad discretion."); Berman, supra note 29, at 388-91.
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commentators regard indeterminate sentencing and rehabilitative
punishment as two complementary halves of a single approach to
criminal justice. 191
The emergence of determinate-guidelines systems has only
somewhat complicated this story. Proponents of sentencing
guidelines in the 1970s and 1980s never rallied behind a single
theory of punishment so much as they united in opposition to the
rehabilitative approach. 192 According to Professor Berman, the push
for binding guidelines was "a conceptual anti-movement" that
"simply [reflected] a rejection of the rehabilitative ideal that had
been dominant for nearly a century . . . . [T]he only clear goals of the
sentencing reforms in many jurisdictions were the repudiation of
rehabilitation as the dominant theory of punishment."'193 The
Sentencing Reform Act and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in
particular, were roundly criticized for their failure to endorse any
particular theory of punishment. 9 4 Instead, the Act included all four
traditional justifications for punishment (retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrence, and incapacitation), 195 and the Guidelines, rather than
adopt a single theory, relied "primarily upon typical, or average,
actual past practice." 196 Even today, commentators differ on what
197
theory of punishment the Guidelines actually reflect.

191.

See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 23, at 1322; Bowman, supra note 1, at 684-

85.
192. See Berman, supra note 29, at 394-95.
193. Berman, supra note 42, at 11.
194. See id. at 12 n.60 (collecting sources).
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012); Berman, supra note 42, at 11-12.
196. Breyer, supra note 147, at 17. Justice Breyer explains that the Commission
was torn between a retributive and a deterrent approach to punishment. Because the
former lacked objectivity and the latter empirical backing, the agency compromised
by rejecting both and instead using past practice.
The distinctions that the Guidelines make in terms of punishment are
primarily those which past practice has shown were actually important
factors in pre-Guideline sentencing. The numbers used and the
punishments imposed would come fairly close to replicating the average
pre-Guidelines sentence handed down to particular categories of criminals.
Where the Commission did not follow past practice, it would consciously
articulate its reasons for not doing so.
Id. at 17-18; see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007) ("Rather than
choose among differing practical and philosophical objectives, the Commission took
an 'empirical approach,' beginning with an empirical examination of 10,000
presentence reports setting forth what judges had done in the past and then
modifying and adjusting past practice in the interests of greater rationality, avoiding
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III. A NEW QUESTION FOR SENTENCING POLICY: How SHOULD WE
DECIDE PUNISHMENT?

This Part suggests a new, fourth question for understanding the
relationship between determinate and indeterminate sentencing:

How should we decide punishment? This question concerns the form
that legal directives for sentencing take, and whether they should be
framed as rules or as standards. Section A reviews the literature on

these two basic forms of legal directive. Section B shows how the
distinction between rules and standards maps onto the distinction
between determinate and indeterminate sentencing. Finally, Section
C explains why thinking about the determinacy spectrum in terms of
rules and standards is important, especially under the federal
government's hybrid sentencing regime.
A. Rules and Standards
Laws take two basic forms: "rules" and "standards."198 These

legal forms serve as "intermediaries" for the various background
social and political principles-for instance, truth, fairness,
efficiency, autonomy, or democracy-that laws are intended to
implement. 199 When legal decision-makers-typically judges-apply
rules and standards in order to resolve disputes, it is hoped that
they will reach outcomes consistent with the relevant background
principles at stake.

inconsistency, complying with congressional instructions, and the like.").
197. Professor Bowman, joined by Judge Paul Cassell, suggests that, in reality,
the Guidelines rejected rehabilitation and instead pursue "a somewhat imprecise
amalgam of 'just deserts' retributivism and utilitarian 'crime control' theories of
deterrence and incapacitation." Bowman, supra note 1, at 693; see also Paul G.
Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique
of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2004) ("In the
Guidelines themselves, the Sentencing Commission articulates two primary
purposes of sentencing: (1) 'just deserts' . . . and 'crime control'[J . . . [b]ut the

determinate sentencing structure of the federal system implicitly rejects the idea
that rehabilitation should determine the length of sentences."). Professor Berman, by
contrast, contends that the Guidelines abandoned the rehabilitative ideal in favor of
a "uniformity ideal." Berman, supra note 42, at 46. Unfortunately, as Professor
Berman notes, the pursuit of uniformity "is fundamentally vacuous when not
grounded in a particular theory of punishment." Id.
198. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Laws as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1177 (1985); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 381
(1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992).
199. Sullivan, supra note 198, at 57.
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A "rule" picks out a key factual or normative consideration
related to the relevant background principle and turns it into a
"trigger" that directs a particular outcome for each case. 200 The sixtyfive mile-per-hour speed limit on the highway, for example, is a
factually triggered rule. 201 The trigger is the driver's speed. If the
driver was traveling faster than sixty-five miles-per-hour, then he or
she committed the offense of speeding. If the driver was traveling
slower than the speed limit, then he or she did not.
A "standard," by contrast, uses a qualitative analysis that
directly applies the relevant background principle to the "totality of
the circumstances" of each case. 20 2 A speed limit framed as a
standard, rather than a rule, for instance, would prohibit drivers
from traveling "faster than is reasonably safe under the
circumstances." 20 3 To determine if a driver violated the law, a judge
would consider all the facts of the case and then decide whether the
driver's speed was "reasonably safe." If the judge determines that
the speed was reasonably safe, then the driver did not commit the
offense of speeding. If judge determines that the speed was not
reasonably safe, then the driver did commit the offense.
Rules allow judges less discretion than do standards. 20 4 Rules
"confine the decisionmaker" to specified considerations, "leaving
irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out
elsewhere." 205 Standards, by contrast, direct judges to consider all
the factors in each case and then to perform a qualitative
assessment of the situation. Of course, as with determinate and
indeterminate models of sentencing, the relationship between rules
206
and standards reflects a spectrum, rather than a sharp binary.
Kathleen Sullivan explains:
A rule may be corrupted by exceptions to the point where it
resembles a standard; likewise, a standard may attach such
fixed weights to the multiple factors it considers that it
resembles a rule ....

200.
201.

A strict rule may have a standard-like

See id. at 58.
See Adam H. Morse, Rules, Standards, and Fractured Courts, 35 OKLA.

CITY U. L. REv. 559, 562-63 (2010).

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Scalia, supra note 198, at 1179; Sullivan, supra note 198, at 58-59.
See Morse, supra note 201, at 562-63.
Sullivan, supra note 198, at 57.
Id.
See id. at 61-62.
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exception, and a standard's207application may be confined to
areas demarcated by a rule.

The relative advantages and disadvantages of rules and
standards have generally been understood in terms of four pairs of
competing values: (1) formal equality versus substantive justice; (2)
certainty versus flexibility; (3) liberty versus substantive equality;
and (4) democracy versus deliberation. Below, I briefly summarize
each of these dichotomies. If this discussion seems to echo my review
of the differences between determinate and indeterminate
sentencing, that is because, as I show later, each of those approaches
to punishment also reflects a rules-versus-standards approach to
legal decision-making.
1. Formal Equality versus Substantive Justice
Rules ensure formal equality at the cost of substantive justice,
while standards promote substantive justice at the cost of formal
equality. 208 Rules ensure that judges will treat like cases alike by
limiting their discretion to deciding the presence or absence of
specific triggering facts; this prevents judges with contrasting
visions of the law or who harbor personal prejudices from reaching
different outcomes in identical cases. 209 At the same time, however,
rules also produce occasional injustices. Because they turn solely on
a few particular facts, they "necessarily capturef the background
principle . . . incompletely[,] and so produce[] errors of over- or

under-inclusiveness." 210 Standards, by contrast, ensure that judges
will make substantively just decisions by instructing them to
consider the totality of the circumstances of each case, thus
"decreas[ing]

.

.

.

211
errors of under- and over-inclusiveness."

Simultaneously, however, standards also result in occasional
disparities, since, by giving judges such broad discretion, they allow
their personal policy views or biases to influence their decisionmaking.

207. Id. at 61.
208. Id. at 62.

209. Id.
210. Id. at 58.
211. Id.
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2. Certainty versus Flexibility

Rules provide certainty at the cost of flexibility, while standards
allow flexibility at the cost of certainty. 212 Rules are clearly
announced in advance, which allows private actors to conform their
conduct to the law 213 and makes it easier for judges to resolve
disputes without reconsidering the unique facts of every single
case. 214 The rigidity of rules, however, also renders them vulnerable
to bad faith manipulation 215 and makes them more costly to develop
at the outset. 216 Standards, by contrast, have less clearly defined
bounds, which gives them a useful flexibility that makes them both
harder to manipulate and cheaper to develop. 2 17 The unpredictability
of standards, of course, also leaves private parties unsure if and
when they are violating the law 218 and forces judges to engage "the
elaborate, time-consuming, and repetitive application of background
2 19
principles to facts" every time they decide a case.
3. Liberty versus Substantive Equality
Rules protect liberty while reducing substantive equality,
whereas standards promote substantive equality at the cost of
liberty. Rules limit the government's power to defined bounds, which
220
cannot be changed by reference to vague legal principles.
Although fixed rules may protect individuals from encroaching
government influence, however, they may also undermine
substantive equality, since they "enableE the shrewd, the
calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate [their] forms to their own
advantage." 221 Standards, conversely, promote substantive equality
since they "favor distributive and paternalist motives." 222 They do so,

212. Id. at 62.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 63.
215. See id.
216. See Morse, supra note 201, at 567.
217. See id.; Sullivan, supra note 198, at 66.
218. Sullivan, supra note 198, at 63.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 63-64.
221. Morton J. Horwtiz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86
YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977).
222. Sullivan, supra note 198, at 67; see also Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1741-51 (1976).
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of course, at the cost of liberty, since their lack of formality may
"pave the way for official 'arbitrariness' if not totalitarianism." 223
4. Democracy versus Deliberation
Rules are more democratic but less deliberative than standards,
while standards encourage deliberation but are less democratic than
rules. Rules ensure a more consistent application of the popular will
because they limit judges solely to deciding the presence or absence
of particular triggers, thus preventing the imposition of judges'
personal policy preferences. 224 That kind of mechanistic decisionmaking, however, is also less effective at communicating the reasons
for each outcome and may allow judges to avoid personal
responsibility for their decisions. 225 The qualitative nature of
standards, by contrast, promotes deliberation, since it "make[s] the
judge face up to his choices. .. [and] make[s] visible and accountable
the inevitable weighing process that rules obscure." 226 Judicial
deliberation, unfortunately, comes at the cost of democracy because
it makes it easier for judges to substitute their own values for those
of the lawmakers.
B. Sentencing Rules and Standards
The distinction between determinate and indeterminate
sentencing-which has previously been analyzed in terms of
institutional choice, conceptions of justice, and theories of
punishment-can also be understood in terms of the form of legal
decision-making used by each system. Determinate sentencing
employs a rule-based system to decide punishments, while
indeterminate sentencing relies on a standard-based approach. The
federal government's hybrid sentencing scheme combines these two
approaches, instructing judges to consider a rule-derived sentence
and a standard-derived sentence and then to pick the better
227
option.

223. Sullivan, supra note 198, at 64.
224. Id.; see also Schlag, supra note 198, at 386 ("By describing the [judge's]
authority in empirical terms, the possibility of usurpation of authority or shirking of
responsibility is minimized.").
225. Sullivan, supranote 198, at 67.
226. Id.
227. Adam H. Morse made a similar observation in the context of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. According to Morse, the Court tends to favor standards over rules
when it issues "fractured" decisions that lack a single majority opinion. See Morse,
supra note 201, at 561-62. He offers several examples of such decisions, including
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Determinate-sentencing systems use rules to decide punishment.
Under a determinate regime, each criminal conviction serves as the
"trigger" for a set penalty provided by the law. Determinate
guidelines systems are a bit more complicated. Rather than relying
on the single trigger of a conviction to determine a penalty,
sentencing guidelines use a series of triggers linked to the facts of
each case in order to calculate an appropriate punishment.
Ultimately, however, this approach to punishment still reflects an
extended exercise in rule-based sentencing. The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, for example, assign each crime a base offense level. That
directive takes the form of a rule-each type of offense triggers a set
base level. Next, the Guidelines instruct the judge to either increase
or decrease the offense level depending on the presence or absence of
particular facts about the case. Again, each of these instructions
takes the form of a rule-the presence or absence of the relevant
facts serves as a trigger for increases or decreases in the offense
level. Third, the Guidelines direct the judge to calculate the
defendant's criminal history category by adding up points based on
the lengths of the offender's prior sentences. Once again, these
calculations are all rule-based. Finally, the judge applies a final rule
by comparing the offender's offense level and criminal history on the
Sentencing Table to yield a narrow range of prison terms.
Considered all together, the Guidelines simply use a more involved
version of the same rule-based decision-making process employed
under traditional determinate sentencing.
Indeterminate sentencing, by contrast, uses standards to decide
punishment. Under an indeterminate regime, judges have wide
discretion to consider all the unique facts of each case and then to
select an appropriate penalty. This decision requires the judge to
perform a qualitative assessment of the case based on the prevailing
theory of punishment. In the post-Civil War era, for example, when

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which he claims "transformed the
[Sentencing] Guidelines from rules to standards." Id. at 596; see also id. at 595-604.
As far as I am aware, Morse is the only other scholar to note the relation of
determinate and indeterminate sentencing to the distinction between rules and
standards. I part ways from him, however, on two points. First, as I explained
earlier, I do not believe that Booker turned the Sentencing Guidelines into a
standard-based regime. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). District court
judges must still calculate a Guidelines' recommendation at each sentencing, and
numerous forces work to encourage most judges to stick to that recommendation. As
a result, I believe that the Guidelines are best understood as a hybrid,
rules/standards-based system of decision-making. Second, while Morse focuses on
Supreme Court practice-and offers an interesting argument on that point-my
primary concerns are sentencing policy and criminal justice.
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the medical model of punishment dominated, the sentencing judge
would sentence based on his assessment of what was necessary to
rehabilitate each offender. The § 3553(a) factors, by contrast, include
the rehabilitative, retributive, incapacitative, and deterrent
justifications for punishment.
The federal government's post-Booker, hybrid sentencing regime
uses both rules and standards to decide punishment. First, the
district judge uses the Guidelines' rules to calculate a recommended,
but not binding, sentence. This rule-based process reflects the
attempt, "wholesale," to achieve a "rough
Commission's
approximation" of the principles of sentencing enumerated
in § 3553(a). 228 Second, the judge conducts an "individualized
assessment" of the facts of each case in light of the sentencing
standard set out in § 3553(a). 229 This assessment includes the four
traditional justifications for punishment (retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation), the need to avoid disparities, and
the need to provide restitution to the victim. 2 30 This standard-based,

qualitative analysis constitutes a "retail" attempt to achieve the
objectives of § 3553(a). 231 Finally, the judge must decide whether to
stick with the Guidelines' recommended sentence or to vary from it
based on his or her individualized assessment of the case. PostBooker, hybrid sentencing, in sum, allows district judges to choose
between rule-derived punishments (the Guidelines) and standardderived punishments (the § 3553(a) factors).
C. Why SentencingRules and StandardsMatter
The relationship between determinate and indeterminate
sentencing on the one hand, and rules- and standards-based
decision-making on the other, is interesting enough on its own, but

228. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348-50 (2007).
229. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
230. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
231. Rita, 551 U.S. at 348. Professor Berman describes this step in the
sentencing process as an exercise in "reasoned judgment." He explains:
After Booker, federal judges may no longer simply find guideline-specified
facts, plug these facts into a guideline calculation, and then in rote fashion
follow the guidelines' predetermined sentencing outcomes. Rather, federal
judges must now integrate and assimilate the facts emphasized by the
guidelines with the dynamic judgment-oriented considerations that are set
forth in section 3553(a).
Berman, supra note 29, at 410-13.
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why does it matter? There are at least three important reasons to
think hard about the connection between sentence determinacy and
legal forms.
First, rules and standards may teach us a lot about sentencing
law and policy. There is already an extensive body of literature
analyzing the relative advantages and disadvantages of rule- and
standard-based decision-making schemes; this runs the gamut from
philosophical inquiries and critical investigations to behavioral and
economic analyses. 232 Applying these insights to the field of
sentencing may yield new insights on criminal punishment. To
sample briefly just a few of the recognized differences between rules
and standards outlined above, it may be that the clarity of rulebased determinate schemes makes them more powerful deterrents to
potential wrongdoers, 233 or it could be that standard-derived
punishments permit a more altruistic and humanist approach to
sentencing234 (a conclusion that would contradict sentencing
reformers who claimed that rule-based guidelines systems would
lead to shorter prison terms).235 Indeed, in the next Part of this
Article, I pick up on one of the most recognized differences between
rules and standards-that rules are inevitably over- or underinclusive as compared to standards-and use it both to explain the
law governing departures and variances from the federal Guidelines
and to suggest improvements to that doctrine.
Second, sentencing law and policy may help us learn more about
rules and standards. The history of determinate and indeterminate
sentencing in the United States, recounted only briefly above, offers
over three centuries of material for the study of rules and standards
in the real world. The post-Booker, hybrid system, in particular,
constitutes a veritable laboratory of rule- versus standard-based
decision-making. Analyzing sentencing through the lens of rules and
standards, therefore, may allow us to test some of our hypotheses
about these legal forms. If, for example, we find that sentencing
guidelines really do make punishments more uniform, we could
corroborate

the

belief that

rules

promote formal

equality.23 6

232. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 201, at 563 nn.14-16 (collecting sources).
233. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 198, at 62 ("[R]ules afford certainty and
predictability to private actors, enabling them to order their affairs productively.").
234. Id. at 66; see also Kennedy, supra note 222, at 1741-51 (discussing the
history of and comparing the formal and substantive economic arguments in private

law conflicts).
235. See Alschuler, supra note 75, at 933.
236. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 198, at 62 ("The argument that rules are fairer
than standards is that like rules require decision makers to act consistently, treating
like cases alike.... [R]ules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias.").
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Contrarily, if we find that federal judges consistently choose to vary
downward from Guidelines' recommendations that are too high, then
we might realize that rules are not quite as liberty-protective as
previously thought. 23 7 Accordingly, in the next Part of this Article, I
analyze the law of departures and variances from the Guidelines in
order to help clarify precisely what occurs at the level of legal form
when a rule is over- or under-inclusive as compared to a standard.
Finally, the federal government's current hybrid sentencing
scheme makes it particularly important to appreciate the distinction
between rule- and standard-based decision-making. The law
governing federal sentencing, as explained earlier, requires a district
judge to consider both a rule-derived sentence (the Guidelines'
recommendation) and a standard-derived sentence (the § 3553(a)
factors) and then to choose the better option. Understanding the
differences between rule- and standard-based decision-making may
help to inform that choice. Picking up on this theme, in the next
Part, I show that rules are both "bumpy" and "disaggregated," which
makes rule-derived punishments more likely to be inconsistent when
sentence enhancements are particularly large or particularly
numerous. In such cases, I suggest that judges should be more
willing to vary from the Guidelines' recommendations and to use
§ 3553(a)'s standard-based approach.
IV. THE LAW OF DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES: WHEN THE RULES "Do
NOT QUITE FIT"

Rules and standards, as just explained, each have several
advantages and disadvantages as compared to the other. One of the
key weaknesses of rules is that they are inevitably over- and underinclusive as compared to standards. As Justice Scalia puts it: "All
generalizations (including, I know, the present one) are to some
degree invalid, and hence every rule of law has a few corners that do
not quite fit."238 The hybrid system of sentencing that the federal
government employs addresses this problem by permitting judges to
"depart" or "vary" from the Guidelines' rule-based decision-making
process. 2 39 District court judges, in other words, may reject the

237. Cf. id. at 63-64 (stating that individuals should be able to make decisions
on the basis of their expectations of how judges will exercise their authority).
238. Scalia, supra note 198, at 1177.
239. There is really only a technical difference between "departures" and
"variances." A "departure" is based on a provision provided in the Guidelines
themselves (essentially, an exception included by the Commission). A "variance," by
contrast, is based on the judge's independent, post-Booker authority to treat the
Guidelines as merely advisory. See United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 801 (9th
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"do not quite fit" the
Guidelines' recommended sentences when they
240
3553(a).
§
in
out
set
sentencing
for
standard
This Part studies the law of departures and variances through
the lens of rules and standards. 241 As I show below, federal law
recognizes two basic categories of error that may result from rulebased decision-making. Each of those categories, in turn, can be
subdivided further into two particular kinds of erroneous rules,
although the law is neither fully realized nor fully consistent in its
treatment of them. I map the concepts as follows:
A. Substantive Errors:
1. Incomplete Rules: Addressed by Sentencing Guidelines
242
4A1.3 and 5K2.0 as well as United States v. Booker.
2. Incorrect Rules: Addressed by Kimbrough v. United
243
States.
B. Formal Errors:
1. Bumpy Rules: Addressed by Sentencing Guideline 4A1.3(b)
244
and application note 3, as well as United States v. Gigante.
2. Disaggregated Rules: Addressed by Sentencing Guideline
5K2.0(c).245

In the next few sections, I examine each of these categories and
the specific kinds of errors they reflect. Section A shows that a
concern over substantive errors-mistakes caused by the content of a
rule-explains nearly all of the law of departures and variances.
Section B demonstrates that federal law also acknowledges, albeit
obliquely and inconsistently, formal errors-mistakes caused by the
structure of rule-based decision-making. I argue that the law of

Cir. 2012). Fundamentally, however, both departures and variances allow district
judges to reject the rule-based decision-making process contained in the Guidelines
when it fails to capture the background principles of sentencing set out in § 3553(a)
of the Sentencing Reform Act. While Booker makes this clear in the case of variances,
it is also true for departures. As the Guidelines explain: "Departures permit courts to
impose an appropriate sentence in the exceptional case in which mechanical
application of the guidelines would fail to achieve the statutory purposes and goals of
sentencing." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0, cmt. background (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).

240. Scalia, supra note 198, at 1177.
241. The one type of departure I do not examine is the one for "substantial
assistance to authorities," since this is intended not to correct an error in rule-based
decision-making, but rather to reward defendants who help with other prosecutions
or investigations. U.S. SENTENCING MANUAL §5kl.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2014).
242.
243.
244.
245.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996).
Sullivan, supra note 198, at 59.
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sentencing should more directly and consistently recognize formal
errors and, accordingly, that judges should be willing to vary from
the Guidelines' recommendations when they involve sentence
adjustments that are particularly large or particularly numerous.
A. Substantive Errors
A substantive error occurs when, due to the composition of a
rule's triggers, it directs an outcome contrary to the background
principle that it is intended to capture. Below, I explain in a bit more
detail what I mean by the "substance" of a rule. Then, in the next
two sections, I explore how the law of sentencing allows judges to
depart or vary from the Guidelines in order to correct two different
kinds of substantive errors.
A rule works, as explained earlier, by picking out a few key
considerations related to the background principle at stake and
turning them into triggers that direct a particular outcome for each
case. By selecting the right triggers, it is hoped that the rule will
produce outcomes that are consistent with the background principle
it is intended to capture. The selection of certain triggering factors
and the disregard of others is the "substance" of a rule. A standard,
by contrast, involves the direct, qualitative application of the
background principle itself to the "totality of the circumstances" of
each case. Because a standard does not depend on triggers, it does
not limit judges to considering only a few particular factors in their
analyses.
The Sentencing Commission chooses the substance of the rules
in the Guidelines in order to capture the background principles of
sentencing enumerated in § 3553(a). 246 In other words, the rules that
comprise the Guidelines-the base offense level assignments for
each crime, the hundreds of possible upward and downward
adjustments, the criminal history calculation, etc.-are all written to
produce recommended sentences approximately in line with
the § 3553(a) principles. Take, for instance, the two-level weapon
enhancement for defendants convicted of burglary. 247 If a defendant
possessed a "dangerous weapon (including a firearm)" during his
offense, the Guidelines instruct the judge to increase his or her
offense

level by two. 248 This upward

adjustment, presumably,

reflects the Commission's judgment that a burglar who possesses a
weapon commits a more serious crime than one who does not, and

246.
247.
2014).

248.

See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348-50 (2007).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
Id.
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therefore that the § 3553(a) principles favor a harsher punishment.
Although every individual burglary involves countless other factors
that inform whether the crime was more or less serious, 249 the
substance of the weapon enhancement includes only the single
trigger of whether the burglar possessed a dangerous weapon. Each
sentencing, of course, involves the application of multiple rules, each
containing different triggers that reflect additional considerations.
A rule commits a substantive error when, due to the composition
of its triggers, it directs an outcome that is contrary to the
background principle that it is supposed to implement. This can
occur in one of two ways, both of which the federal law of sentencing
directly addresses and accommodates. First, a rule may err because
its triggers are incomplete, meaning that it omits from consideration
factors that are relevant to the background principle at stake.
Second, a rule may err because its triggers are incorrect, meaning
that it addresses all the relevant factors but does so in a way that is
contrary to the intended background principle.
1. Incomplete Rules
A rule is incomplete when its selection of triggers omits factors
relevant to the background principle at issue. This problem occurs
when rulemakers fail to foresee the unique circumstances of a
particular case or, because they prefer the form of a rule to standard,
they consciously choose to limit their considerations to a few specific
triggers. Because standards use a "totality of the circumstances"
approach, 250 they are never incomplete in the same way as rules are.
The rules that compose the Sentencing Guidelines are
impressively comprehensive, but they are still inevitably incomplete.
The Sentencing Commission does not have the time or perfect
foresight necessary to address every possible contingency, nor does it
claim to cover so much ground. 251 As a former member of the
Commission, Justice Breyer noted that it is always possible to think
of some additional factor that might affect the seriousness of an
offense. 252 Return, for example, to the burglary guideline. A

249.
250.
251.

See Breyer, supra note 147, at 13.
See Sullivan, supra note 198, at 59.
See Breyer, supra note 147, at 13-14 ("One can always find an additional

characteristic X such that if the bank robber does X, he is deserving of more
punishment.").

252. See id. at 13 (discussing how unmanageable the sentencing system becomes
if the system attempts to account for the limitless amount of factors that could
potentially affect the nature of a crime); see also Nagel, supra note 6, at 935
(hypothesizing the various factors that could affect the seriousness of a bank robbery

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1

defendant who bashes his way in through the front door of an
occupied home at night will receive the exact same recommended
sentence as one who creeps in through the window of an empty home
during the day. Either way, because the Guidelines do not include
triggers that cover the three distinguishing factors (mode of entry,
occupancy, and time), they do not register the difference between
these two crimes. By failing to differentiate between the two
offenses, the Guidelines commit a substantive error. We know this
because, if we considered all the circumstances of each crime in light
of the § 3553(a) principles-in other words, if we applied the
§ 3553(a) principles as a standard-we would very likely conclude
253
that the two crimes actually do deserve different punishments.
The omission in the Guidelines' rules of certain considerations thus
produces an outcome contrary to the background principles at stake.
Fortunately, the law of departures and variances provides two
means for correcting incomplete rules. In such cases, the law permits
sentencing judges to reject the Guidelines' rule-derived punishment
in favor of one derived from § 3553(a). An individualized, "totality of
the circumstances" assessment of the case based on the § 3553(a)
standard allows the sentencing judge to account for the factors that
234.1
the Guidelines' rules missed.
First, even before Booker rendered them advisory, the
Sentencing Guidelines authorized judges to depart from their
recommended sentences if those recommendations failed to account
for all the relevant facts of a case. After Booker, these departures
remain available to judges and take two forms: departures based on
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that the Sentencing
Commission did not consider 254 and departures based on the

such as the use of weapons, the amount of money taken, or whether hostages were
taken).
253. That there is a meaningful difference between these two crimes is evidenced
by the fact that many jurisdictions distinguish between occupied and unoccupied
buildings as well as between daytime and nighttime in defining the crime of
burglary. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 22-801 (2012) (defining first-degree burglary as
breaking and entering an occupied building with the intent to commit a crime inside
and second-degree burglary as breaking and entering an unoccupied building with
the intent to commit a crime inside); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.02 (West 2007) (defining
second-degree burglary as breaking and entering an occupied structure with the
intent to commit a crime inside and third-degree burglary as breaking and entering
an unoccupied structure with the intent to commit a crime inside); Model Penal Code
§ 221.1 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1962) (defining second-degree burglary as
entering a building at night with the intent to commit a crime inside and thirddegree burglary as entering a building during the day with the intent to commit a
crime inside).
254. See U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (U.S. SENTENCING
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inadequacy of the criminal history category. 255 For the first, the
Guidelines provide that the judge may depart from their
recommendation if the case features:
[A]n aggravating or mitigating circumstance... of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that,
in order to advance the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C.
should result in a sentence different from that
§ 3553(a)(2),
256
described.
This departure, in other words, recognizes that the triggers
comprising the offense-level section of the Guidelines are
incomplete, 257 and may therefore miss important considerations that
should result in a higher or lower sentence in light of the principles
of sentencing enumerated by Congress. The Guidelines therefore
permit the sentencing judge to correct the Sentencing Commission's
omission by adjusting upward or downward in accordance with the
§ 3553(a) standard. For the second form of departure, the Guidelines
provide that the judge may depart upward from their
recommendation "[i]f reliable information indicates that the
defendant's criminal history category substantially under-represents
the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood
that the defendant will commit other crimes." 258 The Guidelines then
define "reliable information" as follows:
(A) Prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal
history category (e.g., sentences for foreign and tribal
offenses); (B) Prior sentence(s) of substantially more than one
year imposed as a result of independent crimes committed on
different occasions; (C) Prior similar misconduct established
by a civil adjudication or by a failure to comply with an
administrative order; (D) Whether the defendant was
pending trial or sentencing on another charge at the time of

COMM'N 2014).

255.
256.

See id. § 4A1.3.
Id. § 5K2.0(a)(1).

257. The Guidelines specifically identify a few relevant circumstances that the
Commission may have failed to consider, see id. §§ 5K2.0-5K2.24, and they also
acknowledge that there may be "exceptional case[s]" featuring not-yet-identified but
still relevant circumstances. Id. § 5K2.0.
258. Id. § 4A1.3(a)(1).
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the instant offense; (E) Prior similar2 59
adult criminal conduct
not resulting in a criminal conviction.
Each of these provisions concerns a past criminal act that is not
included in the initial criminal history calculation. Once again, this
departure recognizes that the triggers comprising the criminal
history section of the Guidelines are incomplete, and may therefore
produce sentences that are too lenient. In such cases, the Guidelines
permit the sentencing judge to correct the error by departing
upward. There is also a parallel provision allowing downward
departures when the criminal history category "substantially overrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history," 260
although, as I show below, the story there is even more interesting.
Second, after Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory, federal
judges have used their power to vary from their recommendations
when they missed some important aspect of the case. Recall that a
consequence of Booker's adjustments to the Sentencing Reform Act is
that district judges must now "give respectful consideration to the
Guidelines," but are permitted "to tailor the sentence in light of
[§ 3553(a)] concerns as well."261 Most of the cases in which judges
have embraced their new power to vary from the Guidelines have
involved situations where the Sentencing Commission failed to
consider all the relevant circumstances presented by the case. In
United States v. Ruvalcava-Perez, for instance, the Guidelines
recommended a sentence of 130 to 162 months for a drug offender. 262
The district court varied upward by forty-eight months-imposing a
210 month prison term-because it concluded that the Guidelines
failed to account for the offender's long history of violence,
particularly against women. 263 In United States v. Autery, a child
pornography case, the Guidelines recommended a forty-one to fiftyone month term of imprisonment, but the district court varied
downward to a sentence of five years probation. The court found that
the recommendation did not account for the fact that the defendant
did not fit the profile of a pedophile and that he had the full support
of his family. 264 Finally, in United States v. Cavera, the district court
varied upward by six months from a Guidelines' recommendation of
twelve to eighteen months on the ground that the crime-gun
smuggling-was more harmful when committed in the unique urban

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. § 4A1.3(a)(2).
Id. § 4A1.3(b)(1).
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007).
See United States v. Ruvalcava-Perez, 561 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 885-86.
United States v. Autery, 555 F.3d 864, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2009).
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environment of New York City. 265 Countless additional examples
266
exist in which judges have varied from recommended sentences.
Together, these cases demonstrate that judges are willing to vary
from the Guidelines in favor of the § 3553(a) standard when the rulebased decision-making process omits an important trigger.
2. Incorrect Rules
A rule is incorrect when its triggers address all the relevant
factors in a case but do so in a way that is at odds with the
background principle at issue. This problem occurs when rulemakers
exercise bad policy judgment. The identification of such errors then
depends on one's personal political perspective. Because standards
employ a more flexible, qualitative analysis, they allow judges the
discretion to avoid the kinds of policy errors caused by incorrect
rules.
To understand what happens when a rule is incorrect, imagine,
for example, a (fictional) upward adjustment that increases the base

265.
266.
(upward
"actively

United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 370 F. App'x 638, 646 (6th Cir. 2010)
variance based on the fact that defendant, a child molester, had been
seeking additional victims"); United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d

629, 635 (6th Cir. 2010) (upward variance based on defendant's repeated illegal
reentries and DUIs); United States v. Hilgers, 560 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2009) (upward
variance based on defendant's past criminal conduct and con man behavior); United
States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir. 2009) (downward variance based on
defendant's physical and mental disabilities); United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732,
742 (4th Cir. 2009) (upward variance based on defendant's increasing
dangerousness); United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2008) (downward
variance based on defendant's military service and remorse); United States v.
Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 2008) (downward variance based on
defendant's youth and depression at the time of the offense and his rehabilitation
efforts since); United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2008) (downward
variance based on defendant's familial support and potential for rehabilitation);
United States v. Lehmann, 513 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 2008) (downward variance
based on defendant's need to care for his disabled son); United States v. Dehghani,
550 F.3d 716, 722-23 (8th Cir. 2008) (upward variance based on the seriousness of
the defendant's conduct and his outrageous behavior during the pendency of the
case); United States v. Anderson, 533 F.3d 623, 633 (8th Cir. 2008) (downward
variance based on other forms of punishment defendant had suffered for his crime);
United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1296, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007) (downward
variance based on defendant's severe history of abuse); United States v. White, 506
F.3d 635, 644 (8th Cir. 2007) (downward variance based on defendant's age and
medical condition); United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 474 (4th Cir. 2007)
(downward variance based on fact that child pornography was in the form of Polaroid
photos, rather than digital files).
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offense level for the crime of burglary by twenty if the offender broke
into a home at nighttime, rather than daytime. Although this rule
addresses a potentially relevant factor, it does so in an excessively
punitive way. Or, take the guideline for a drug trafficking offense,
which assigns offense levels based on the quantity of drugs that the
defendant possessed during the offense. 267 The Sentencing
Commission recently voted to approve an across-the-board reduction
of the levels prescribed by the table, based on its conclusion that the
provision was unnecessarily harsh.268 In other words, the
Commission decided that the old rule was incorrect. Indeed, many
criticisms of the Sentencing Guidelines are actually identifications of
incorrect rules. "At or near the root of virtually every serious
criticism of the [G]uidelines is the concern that they are too
harsh."269 This is especially true for drug-related crimes.

Kennedy 271-are

270

Such

not suggesting that the
critics-including Justice
Commission missed some relevant factor that should have been
taken into consideration. Instead, they are arguing that the
Commission miscalibrated in the way that it addressed the relevant
factors in light of the § 3553(a) goals of sentencing. Again, because
the identification of an incorrect trigger reflects a policy judgment,
not everybody may agree on which rules are incorrect.
A series of cases since Booker have provided a way for judges to
remedy incorrect rules, permitting them to vary from the Guidelines
based on policy disagreements with the Sentencing Commission and
to apply instead their own interpretation of the § 3553(a) sentencing
standard. The main case is Kimbrough v. United States,272 in which
varied downward
from a Guidelines'
a
district judge
recommendation for a crack cocaine offender on the ground that the
Guidelines' disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses
was both "disproportionate" and "unjust."2 73 The judge lamented

that if the defendant had been convicted of a powder cocaine offense,

the recommended sentence would have been only half as long. 274 The

267.

See

U.S.

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

MANUAL

§

2D1.1(a)(5), (c) (U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).

268.

News, Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Commission

Unanimously Votes to Allow Delayed Retroactive Reduction in Drug Trafficking
Sentences (July 18, 2014).
269. Bowman, supra note 23, at 1328-32.
270. See id.
271. See Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech Delivered at the American Bar
Association Annual Meeting, 2003 WL 23475479 at *127 (Aug. 9, 2003).
272. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
273. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 93.
274.

Id.
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Supreme Court affirmed the variance, emphasizing that Booker
made the Guidelines "'effectively advisory,"' and therefore that "even
in a mine-run case," district courts have the authority to conclude
"that the crack/powder disparity yield[ed] a sentence greater than
necessary to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes." 275 Two years later, the
Court reaffirmed that district courts have the "authority to vary
from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on policy disagreement with
them."276 Since then, courts of appeals around the country have

expanded Kimbrough to permit policy-based variances from other
Guidelines, including those for child pornography,2 7 7 career
offenders, 278 offender characteristics, 279 and firearms. 2 0 As a result
of these cases, district courts have the power to vary from the
Guidelines if they believe that their rules are incorrect in light of the
principles for sentencing set out in § 3553(a).
B. Formal Errors
A formal error occurs when, due to a rule's trigger-based
structure, the rule directs an outcome at odds with the background
principle at stake. Below, I explain what I mean by the "form" of a
rule. Then, in the following two sections, I show how the law of
sentencing allows judges to depart or vary from the Guidelines in
order to correct two kinds of formal errors, albeit only obliquely and
inconsistently. I argue that federal law should be more direct and
more consistent in permitting judges to reject the Guidelines'
recommendations when they have reason for concern about formal
errors, especially when sentence adjustments are particularly large
or numerous.
A rule works, as explained earlier, by instructing a judge to
make a particular factual or normative finding, which then triggers
a predefined consequence. When a trigger is factual, it requires the
judge to decide whether, given the applicable standard of proof, the
fact in question is sufficiently likely to be true. For example, when a

275. Id. at 90, 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264 (2009) (per curiam).
277. See United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 606 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Huffstatler, 571 F.3d
620, 623 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259, 271 (1st Cir. 2008).
278. See United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 87 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Sanchez, 517
F.3d 651, 666 (2d Cir. 2008).
279. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 488 (2011); United States v.
Simmons, 568 F.3d 564, 568 (5th Cir. 2009).
280. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).
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judge applies the speed limit, he or she must determine whether the
driver exceeded sixty-five miles per hour. If so, the offender receives
a ticket. When a trigger is normative, it asks the decision-maker to
determine whether some particular value has been satisfied. For
instance, the self-defense justification for murder depends on
whether the defendant's use of self-defense was "reasonable." If it
was, he or she is acquitted. 28 ' Two key features define this method of
decision-making. First, it is binary. Second, it is atomized. This
binary, atomized structure is the "form" of a rule.
Rules are binary because they turn on triggers. Triggers limit
judges' decision-making to only two options. Either the trigger is
satisfied and the rule's consequence applies, or the trigger is not
satisfied and the rule's consequence does not apply. This makes
rules look a little like on/off switches. A judge applying a rule must
decide whether or not its trigger is fulfilled. If it is, the rule turns
"on," and its specified consequence applies in full. If it is not, the rule
stays "off," and there is no consequence at all. A standard, like a
rule, may also feature a binary structure if it involves an analysis
with just two possible outcomes. The speed limit standard referenced
earlier, for example, asks only whether the defendant's driving was
reasonably safe or not. At the same time, however, the qualitative
nature of a standard allows it to take a non-binary form, directing a
decision-maker to select from a broad range of options based on his
or her general assessment of the case.
Rules are atomized because they turn on a limited number of
triggers. Rules typically include just one trigger, and hardly ever
more than two or three triggers, because anything more would
become unmanageable. This means that rules break down situations
into individual considerations, each weighed in isolation from the
other, rather than all at once. A judge applying multiple rules to a
single case, in other words, must make a discrete finding for whether
each trigger for each separate rule has been fulfilled. Instead of
conducting an overall assessment of the situation, the judge applies
multiple rules seriatim, one at a time, in order to produce a result. A
standard by, contrast, is not atomized because it involves a "totality
of the circumstances" analysis. This comprehensive review of the
case allows a judge to simultaneously weigh all the relevant
considerations, rather than take them one-by-one in a broken-down,
atomized fashion.

281. Cf. Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2,
40-41 (2012) (explaining that if the reason for using force was "nearly reasonable"
and the level of force was "nearly reasonable[,]" then aggregating the defenses could
lead to acquittal).

2015]

SENTENCING RULES AND STANDARDS

A rule commits an error of form when, due to the binary,
atomized structure of trigger-based decision-making, it directs an
outcome that is inconsistent with the background principle that it is
supposed to implement. This can occur in one of two ways. First, the
binary structure of rules makes them "bumpy," meaning that they
fail to account for gradual changes in probabilistic or normative
inputs. Second, the atomized structure of rules makes them
"disaggregated," meaning that they fail to provide an overall
evaluation of probabilities or normative weights. Because these
errors are caused by the structure of a rule and not its content, a
rule can commit a formal error even if it completely and correctly
addresses all the relevant circumstances of a case.
1. Bumpy Rules
Rules are "bumpy," which means that their outputs do not
account for gradual changes to their inputs. Rules therefore direct
outcomes that do not accurately reflect the strength of the evidence
or the normative weight of that evidence, creating tension-and
sometimes outright contradiction-with the background principles
they are intended to implement. As I show below, this problem
occurs in two forms: probabilistic bumpiness and normative
bumpiness. The law of sentencing has, in a few isolated places,
allowed district courts to correct bumpy rules. However, I argue that
policymakers and judges must do more to address this concern,
particularly in cases involving large sentence adjustments.
a. Probabilisticand Normative Bumpiness
Adam J. Kolber uses the terms "bumpy" and "smooth" to describe
the relationship between inputs and outputs in legal decisionmaking. 282 A law is "bumpy," he explains, "when a gradual change to
the input sometimes dramatically affects the output and sometimes
has no effect at all." 28 3 A law is "smooth," by contrast, "when, as the
input gradually changes, the output gradually changes in the
appropriate direction." 284 Kolber offers the example of a traditional
light switch versus a dimmer knob to illustrate the difference
between bumpy and smooth laws. Light switches are bumpy: "When
the switch begins to arc from the off position to the on position, it
has no effect at all on the light in the room. Then, at some particular

282.

Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 CAL. L. REV. 655, 661-62

(2014).

283.

Id. at 657.

284.

Id. at 661.
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place along the path of the switch, the light suddenly turns on."28 5

Dimmer knobs, by contrast, are smooth: "As you gradually turn the
knob clockwise, the light emitted gradually increases. As you
gradually turn the knob counterclockwise, the light emitted
28 6
gradually decreases."
Rules' being reliant on binary triggers makes them "bumpy" in
their evaluation of factual probabilities and in their assessment of
normative weights. To apply a rule, the judge must determine
whether its trigger has been satisfied. If that trigger is tied to a fact,
then the judge must decide whether the evidence for that fact
satisfies the requisite burden of proof. If, alternatively, the rule's
trigger is tied to a value, then the judge must decide whether that
value has been satisfied. Either way, this is the "input" for the rule.
As a result of the judge's determination, the rule's consequence will
either apply in full or it will not apply at all. This is the "output" for
the rule. Because each step in this process comprises a binary, "allor-nothing" pair of options, 28 7 the rule's trigger is either fulfilled or
not fulfilled; its consequence either applies or does not apply. The
relationship between a rule's input and output is bumpy. As the
input increases, nothing happens until the rule's trigger has been
satisfied. Until that point, there is no output. After that point, the
output applies in full. The greater a rule's consequences, the greater
the disparity between its input and its output, and the bumpier it is.
Standards, by contrast, employ a less rigid qualitative analysis,
permitting judges to adjust legal outcomes in light of the applicable
288
principles and thus avoid the bumpiness caused by binary rules.

285.
286.
287.

Id. at 662.
Id. at 661.
Cf.Talia Fisher, Conviction Without Conviction, 96 MINN. L. REV. 833, 834-

35 (2012) (construing conviction as "an on-off decision, leading to all-or-nothing

sentencing").
288. Professor Kolber observes that the smoothlbumpy distinction does not map
perfectly onto the rule/standard distinction because the latter "helps us formulate a
threshold test to distinguish permitted and prohibited conduct ...[but] says nothing
. . . about whether the penalty associated with crossing the threshold kicks in
gradually or dramatically." Kolber, supra note 282, at 666. The speed limit, for
example, can be articulated as a rule ("no driving faster than sixty-five miles per
hour") or as a standard ("no driving faster than is reasonably safe"). Either way,
however, that distinction serves only to identify what conduct constitutes illegal
speeding. In both cases, the associated penalty could either be bumpy (a flat $100
fine for all violations) or smooth (a $10 fine for every mile-per-hour driven over sixtyfive, or a fine proportional to the unreasonableness of the driver's speed). See id.
"Hence," Professor Kolber concludes, "whether a threshold is framed as a rule or a
standard, the penalty for violation can be either smooth or bumpy." Id. at 67. This is
half true. While the consequences for both rules and standards can be made more or
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Rules may be bumpy in two ways: probabilistically and
normatively. Both forms of bumpiness will sometimes produce
outcomes that are at odds with the rule's background principle.
Remember, because these are errors of form, not substance, they will
occur even if lawmakers design rules that completely and correctly
address all the relevant factors in every case.
A rule with a factual trigger is probabilistically bumpy. As the
probability of the fact's truth increases, there is no change in the
rule's output until the applicable standard of proof has been
satisfied. Once that threshold of proof has been crossed and the
truth of the fact is established, the rule's output applies in full. Take
the "Use of Body Armor" provision in the Sentencing Guidelines,
which instructs the sentencing judge to raise a defendant's offense
level by four if he or she finds that the offender used body armor in
28 9
the commission of a drug-trafficking crime or a crime of violence.
As the evidence against a defendant piles up, the probability that he
used body armor will increase-from ten percent to thirty percent to
forty-nine percent-but there will be no change in consequences
until the requisite probability threshold (fifty percent) has been
crossed. 290 At that point, the judge will conclude that that the
defendant indeed used body armor, and the rule's output-a fourlevel offense level increase-will apply in full. If the evidence
continues to accumulate, and the probability that the defendant
used body armor increases beyond fifty percent, there will, again, be
no change in consequences.
Probabilistically bumpy rules will occasionally-and inevitablyproduce outcomes at odds with their relevant background principles.
For example, when a sentencing judge believes that there is a
seventy percent chance that a defendant used body armor in the

less bumpy, the trigger-based nature of rules means that they will always be
fundamentally bumpy. Only standards can be made perfectly smooth. Take, for
example, Professor Kolber's example of a speed-limit rule with a smooth penalty-a
$10 fine for every mile-per-hour driven faster than sixty-five. This is certainly less
bumpy than an automatic $100 penalty imposed on all violators, regardless of their
speed. But because it turns on a trigger-each mile per hour driven over the speed
limit triggers a $10 increase in the fine-it is still inherently bumpy. The penalty
does not distinguish, for instance, between a driver who traveled at seventy milesper-hour and one who traveled at 70.9 miles-per-hour. Both receive the same $50
fine. Only a standard, which uses a qualitative analysis, can be made perfectly
smooth because it allows decision-makers to select consequences that scale
seamlessly to their assessments of the facts.
289. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.5 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).

290. Cf. Fisher, supra note 287, at 835 (explaining the threshold model of
criminal conviction).
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commission of a crime, he or she will apply the full four-point
offense-level increase, even though there is a thirty percent chance
that the defendant did not actually use body armor, and
consequently, that the increase should not be applied at all. Put
another way, for thirty percent of all such enhancements applied at
seventy percent certainty, defendants will have their sentences
extended despite the fact that they did not actually use body armor.
In those cases where the defendant did not actually use body armor,
the Guidelines' recommended sentence is longer than the § 3553(a)
punishment standard would provide. Conversely, if the judge
believes that there is no greater than a forty-nine percent chance
that a defendant wore body armor, he or she will apply no offenselevel increase, even though there is a high probability that he or she
should have. In just under half of such cases, then, the sentence will
be shorter than it should be according to the § 3553(a) principles.
291
A rule that turns on a value judgment is normatively bumpy.
As the normative weight supporting the value in question increases,
there is no change in the rule's output. Once that value has been
established, however, the rule's output applies in full. Consider, for
example, the "Reckless Endangerment During Flight" provision in
the Sentencing Guidelines, which instructs that if a sentencing judge
finds that a defendant "recklessly created a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing
from a law enforcement officer," he or she should increase his offense
level by two.2 92 The input for this Guideline is a value judgment-it
is triggered if the defendant's conduct while he fled from law
enforcement was "reckless."293 To make a finding of whether or not
the defendant's behavior was reckless, the sentencing judge must
base this consideration on a normative scale of carelessness. As the
carelessness of the defendant's conduct increases, there will be no
additional consequence until the judge concludes that the threshold
for recklessness has been crossed. At that point, the rule's output-a
two-level offense level increase-will apply in full. If the carelessness
of the defendant's conduct increases beyond that required for
recklessness, there will, again, be no further consequence.
Normatively bumpy rules will occasionally-and unavoidablyproduce outcomes in tension with their relevant background
principles. For instance, when a sentencing judge believes that a
defendant's conduct just barely crosses the line into recklessness, he

291. Cf. Porat & Posner, supra note 281, at 6 (explaining that normative
aggregation has "cross-claim[s], cross-element[s], and within-element variations").
292. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
293. Id.
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or she will apply the full four-level adjustment, even though that
defendant is only barely culpable enough to warrant the increased
punishment. A marginally reckless defendant, in other words, will
receive the exact same sentence enhancement as an egregiously
reckless defendant. Such an outcome seems in conflict with the
§ 3553(a) sentencing principles, which would suggest that the more
reckless defendant should receive a longer sentence than the less
reckless one. 294 Similarly, if the judge believes that a defendant's
behavior fell just short of recklessness, then she will apply no
increase at all, although that defendant may still have been quite
careless. The just-barely-not-reckless defendant, then, will receive a
than the just-barely-reckless
significantly shorter sentence
defendant. Again, the standards for sentencing set out in § 3553(a)
would counsel in favor of a different outcome: 295 because these two
defendants engaged in nearly identical conduct, they should receive
the same punishment.
b. Bumpiness in the Law of Sentencing
The law of sentencing allows judges to reject Guidelines'
recommendations when they pose problems of probabilistic or
normative bumpiness, but it does so only obliquely and
inconsistently. This is a problem, especially for particularly largeand thus particularly bumpy-sentence adjustments. In such cases,
judges should correct the error by varying from the Guidelines and
instead sentencing based on the § 3553(a) standard, which allows
them to take into account subtler gradations in probabilities and
norms.
The Second Circuit addressed the Guidelines' probabilistic
bumpiness in United States v. Gigante,296 a case involving two
defendants convicted of extortion. 297 At sentencing, the Guidelines
assigned each defendant a base offense level of eighteen, which, in
combination with their criminal histories, would have yielded
298
recommended sentences of twenty-seven to thirty-three months.
The district judge, however, applied several upward adjustments
related to the defendants' roles in the offense, taking into
consideration the amount of money they extorted and their attempts

294. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
295. See id.
296. 94 F.3d 53, 56 (1996).
297. See United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated,
reh'g denied and abrogated by 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996).
298. Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
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to obstruct justice. 299 In total, these enhancements raised the
defendants' total offense levels to thirty-four and thirty-five, yielding
much higher recommended sentences of 151 to 188 months and 168
to 210 months, respectively. 300 The judge ultimately imposed a 188month sentence on one defendant and a 200-month sentence on the
30 1
other.
Although the Second Circuit affirmed both sentences, it also
warned district judges to remain aware of the "danger of factual
error" when they applied probabilistically bumpy offense-level
adjustments, especially if those adjustments were particularly
large. 30 2 The court contrasted the trigger-based nature of Guidelines'
sentencing to the standard-based approach of "the pre-Guidelines
era," noting that, back then, "the extent of judicial discretion was
such that the sentence might be ratcheted in a rough way upward or
downward according to the weight of the evidence." 303 The Second
Circuit advised sentencing judges to reject the Guidelines'
recommendations when the probability of the relevant facts was not
commensurate with the extent of the applicable offense-level
adjustments. In other words, the court held that district judges
should depart from the Guidelines when they are particularly
bumpy:
In our view, the preponderance standard is no more than a
threshold basis for adjustments and departures, and the
weight of the evidence, at some point along a continuum of
sentence severity, should be considered with regard to both
upward adjustments and upward departures. With regard to
upward adjustments, a sentencing judge should require that
the weight of the factual record justify a sentence within the
adjusted Guidelines range. In doing so, the Court may
examine whether the conduct underlying multiple upward
adjustments was proven by a standard greater than that of
preponderance, such as clear or convincing or even beyond
reasonable doubt where appropriate. Where a higher
standard, appropriate to a substantially enhanced sentence
range, is not met, the court should depart downwardly.304

299.
300.

Id.
Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table

(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).

301.
302.
303.
304.

See Gigante, 39 F.3d at 44, 46.

See id. at 46-47.
Id.
Id.
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By departing from the Guidelines in favor of the § 3553(a)
standard, Gigante suggests that judges can factor "the weight of the
evidence" into their sentencing decisions and thus ensure sentencing
outcomes more consistent with the background principles of
punishment. 305 This decision demonstrates that the judiciary is at
least partly aware of the problem posed by probabilistically bumpy
rules for deciding punishment. It also shows that the law of
sentencing is capable of taking that problem into account.
The Sentencing Guidelines also hint at some awareness of the
problems posed by normatively bumpy rules in the provision
concerning departures for a defendant having an inadequate
criminal history. The Guidelines, as mentioned above, instruct that
judges should depart downward from a recommended sentence if the
criminal history category "substantially over-represents the
seriousness of the defendant's criminal history."306 The policy
statement appended to this section offers a crucial example: "A
downward departure from the defendant's criminal history category
may be warranted if ...

the defendant had two minor misdemeanor

convictions close to ten years prior to the instant offense and no
other evidence of prior criminal behavior in the intervening
period."30 7 This statement is, in effect, recognition that the rules for
308
calculating a defendant's criminal history are normatively bumpy.

"[T]wo minor misdemeanor convictions close to ten years prior to the
instant offense" will cross the normative threshold necessary to

305. Because Gigante was decided before Booker, the Court had to justify this
departure authority using the text of the Guidelines and did so by holding that "the
risk of factual error in a series of adjustments, each of which involves conduct proven
by a bare preponderance, is a circumstance present at least 'to a degree' not
adequately considered by the Commission." Gigante, 94 F.3d at 56 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)). Of course, since Booker rendered the Guidelines non-binding, this
doctrinal grounding is no longer necessary-as I explain further below, a variance
would be perfectly appropriate in this situation.
306. U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
307. Id. § 4A1.3 cmt. 3.
308. Cf. United States v. Shoupe, 988 F.2d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 1993) ('Criminal
history' is, relatively, one of the most flexible concepts in the guidelines. While it is
possible to classify the severity of current federal offenses with a reasonable degree
of precision, mathematically accurate evaluation of the countless permutations of
criminal history, involving offenses high and petty committed in numerous
jurisdictions, would be at best unwieldy. The Sentencing Commission recognized this
difficulty, and though it prescribed a mathematical method to calculate criminal
history, it specifically identified overstatement or understatement of the seriousness
of the defendant's past conduct as a ground for departure from the raw criminal
history score.").
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trigger an increase to a defendant's criminal history category. 309 Yet
they are so close to the normative line that the policy statement
suggests that it would be a mistake to enhance an offender's
sentence on that basis alone. In such cases, again, departing from
the Guidelines in favor of the § 3553(a) standard allows judges to
finely tune their sentences based on a more gradated assessment of
the case. Although the Commission has only addressed the problem
of normative bumpiness in this one, relatively obscure corner of the
Guidelines, the same potential error, of course, may occur with the
application of any of the rules in the Guidelines that turn on valuebased triggers.
The law of sentencing can and should address the errors caused
by probabilistically and normatively bumpy rules by expanding
judges' authority to depart or vary from the Guidelines in such cases.
This expansion should begin with the largest sentence adjustments,
which are also the bumpiest and thus commit the most significant
formal errors. Take, for example, the Sentencing Guidelines'
provision for the crime of possessing dangerous weapons or
materials aboard an aircraft. 31° The Guidelines assign a base offense
level of nine for the crime, but then instruct that the judge should
apply a fifteen-level increase if the offense "was committed willfully
and without regard for the safety of human life, or with reckless
disregard for the safety of human life." 311 That upward adjustment
would quintuple the recommended prison sentence for a first time
offender, potentially based on only a fifty-one percent certain factual
trigger. 3 12 The disparity between the input and output for this rule is
quite significant, making this Guideline extremely bumpy. Although
gun-toting aircraft passengers are probably not the primary concern
of sentencing policymakers, this is not the only large upward
adjustment in the Guidelines. 313 The Guidelines' drug-trafficking
provisions, which are a significant focus of criminal justice reformers
3 14
and apply in approximately one-third of all federal sentencings,

309.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 cmt. 3 (U.S. SENTENCING

COMM'N 2014); see id. §4A1.1(b), (c).

310. Id. § 2K1.5.
311. Id. § 2K1.5(a), (b).
312. See Schuman, supra note 88, at 229-30.
313. The crime of mishandling environmental pollutants, for example, has a base
offense level of six, which is increased by eleven points if "the offense resulted in a
substantial

likelihood

of death or serious

bodily

injury."

U.S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.3(a), (b)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).

SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
314. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2012
SENTENCING STATISTICS Fig. A: Offenders in Each Primary Offense Category,

http://www.ussc.gov/Research andStatistics/AnnualReportsand-Sourcebooks/201
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are also extraordinarily bumpy. Drug-trafficking sentences depend,
in large part, on the sentencing judge's determination of the
quantity of drugs involved in the offense, a fact finding that has the
potential to effectively increase a defendant's offense level by as
many as thirty-two levels. 315 Indeed, drug-quantity determinations
3 16
routinely result in increases of ten offense levels or more.
District courts should therefore be ready to use their authority
under Booker to vary from Guidelines' recommendations that involve
especially large sentence adjustments. When a judge calculates a
Guidelines' sentence using a particularly bumpy rule, the output
may either fail to accurately reflect the strength of the evidence in
the case (probabilistic bumpiness) or the normative weight of that
evidence (normative bumpiness). In such cases, the Guidelines'
recommendation will not be consistent with the principles of
sentencing set out in § 3553(a). Under Booker, then, the sentencing
judge may vary from the Guidelines' recommendation in favor of a
qualitative application of the § 3553(a) standard, which would allow
him or her to take into account the gradations in the relevant
3 17
evidence and norms and impose a more appropriate sentence.
Meanwhile, at a systemic level, Congress and the Sentencing
Commission should reform the federal law of sentencing to address
the problems caused by bumpy rules. For instance, to make the
Sentencing Guidelines smoother, they could decrease the size of the
largest sentence adjustments, which would ensure a closer
relationship between each rule's inputs and outputs. Or, to account
for the bumpiest rules, policymakers could add a downward
departure to the Guidelines for cases involving particularly large
318
sentence adjustments, such as drug-trafficking offenses.
2. Disaggregated Rules
Rules are "disaggregated," which means that they break down
their analysis of a situation into individual, isolated components.
Rules, therefore, direct outcomes that are inconsistent with an

2/FigureA.pdf.
315. Schuman, supranote 88, at 252.
316. See United States v. Mills, 710 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (twelve level
upward adjustment); United States v. Correa-Alicea, 585 F.3d 484, 488 (1st Cir.
2009) (four level upward adjustment); United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1258
(10th Cir. 2008) (twelve level upward adjustment); United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d
1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (sixteen level upward adjustment).
317. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 267 (2004).
318. Cf. Schuman, supra note 88, at 268-69 (suggesting one such reform for the
drug-trafficking Guideline).
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overall evaluation of the case, thus contradicting their background
principles. As I show below, this problem, just like bumpiness, occurs
in two forms: probabilistic disaggregation and normative
disaggregation. The law of sentencing has provided a partial means
to correct disaggregated rules, but I contend that policymakers and
judges must do more to address this concern, particularly in cases
involving multiple sentence adjustments.
a. Probabilisticand Normative Disaggregation
Ariel Porat and Eric Posner identify "aggregation puzzles" as "an
important vulnerability at the heart of the law." 319 Because the law
"relies on legal categories that organize the judicial treatment of
disputes," and because "[t]hese categories operate at different levels
of generality," judges frequently must "disregard information that is
relevant to an overall evaluation of the asserted wrongdoing."320 In
particular, the professors say, the law fails to aggregate "two types of
3 21
things: factual information and normative weight."
Rules' atomization of the facts of a case into separate triggering
factors means that when a judge applies multiple rules, they will be
"disaggregated" in their evaluation of factual probabilities and their
assessment of normative weights. 3 22 When a judge applies a rule, he
or she is effectively analyzing a situation based on only one specific
triggering factor. When he or she applies multiple rules, each
triggering factor "is considered separately, isolated from" the other,
such that "some of the factual information that is relevant for
evaluating" the overall merits of the case "may need to be

319. Porat & Posner, supra note 281, at 4, 7; see also Alon Harel & Ariel Porat,
Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal Responsibility for Unspecified
Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261, 266 (2009) (discussing the utility and potential
objections to implementing the aggregate probabilities principle in various areas of
the law).
320. Porat & Posner, supra note 281, at 7 (emphasis added).
321. Id. at 8.
322. Professors Porat and Posner only hint at the relationship between rules and
disaggregation:
All of the[se] cases reflect a familiar rules/standards tradeoff.... The basic
breakdown of wrongdoing into bodies of law, and then those bodies of law
into claims, and those claims into elements, brings a regimented clarity to
the process of learning and applying the law. But the disaggregation of
wrongdoing into a series of rules comes at a cost: morally relevant
information is lost.
Id. at 9.
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disregarded when one claim is evaluated, and other factual
information disregarded when the other claim is evaluated."3 23 As a
result, if a case falls just short of fulfilling the triggers for two
separate rules, neither of the consequences for the rules will apply,
even though an overall evaluation of the case might have counseled
in favor of applying at least one of them. 324 Standards, by contrast,

apply a qualitative analysis to the "totality of the circumstances" of
each case, allowing judges to consider all the facts of a situation
simultaneously and, thus, to avoid the disaggregation caused by
atomized rules.
Once again, there are two forms of disaggregation: probabilistic
and normative. Both probabilistically and normatively disaggregated
rules will sometimes produce outcomes that contradict their relevant
background principles. Recall, that these are errors of form, not
substance. Such errors will occur even if lawmakers design rules
that completely and correctly address all the relevant factors for
every case.
Rules with factual triggers are probabilistically disaggregated.
When a judge applies multiple fact-triggered rules to a single case,
he or she is unable to perform an overall evaluation of the evidence.
Imagine, for instance, a defendant sentenced under the "aggravated
assault" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. 325 At the sentencing
hearing, the district judge concludes, based on the evidence, that it is
forty-five percent likely that the defendant planned the assault (a
two-level increase), forty-five percent likely that he discharged a
firearm (a five-level increase), forty-five percent likely that the
victim suffered an injury (a three-level increase), and forty-five
percent likely that the defendant was motived by a payment of
money (a two-level increase).3 26 Because the judge considers each
adjustment in isolation, none of them will apply, and the defendant
will not receive an increased sentence. Yet, if we aggregated the
probabilities for each adjustment, we would find that it is over
ninety percent certain that at least one of them should have applied
(in other words, that at least one of the triggering facts was actually
true).327 Conversely, if the judge believed it fifty-five percent likely
that each of the upward adjustments should apply, then the
defendant's offense level would be increased by twelve, even though,

323.
324.

Id. at 7.
See id. at 8.

325. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
326. See id. § 2A2.2(b)(1)-(3), 5.
327. Again, this assumes that the evidence for each adjustment is independent.
See Porat & Posner, supra note 281, at 5 n.1.
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aggregating the probabilities, the odds that at least one of the
adjustments was wrongly applied would, again, be over ninety
percent (in other words, that at least one of the triggering facts was
not actually true).
Probabilistically disaggregated rules produce outcomes that
contradict their relevant background principles. For example, if
there are four factually triggered upward adjustments that might
apply to a case, and each adjustment is supported by evidence
establishing that the relevant fact is forty-five percent likely to be
true, then none of the adjustments will apply, and the defendant will
receive no increased punishment. Treating each sentence
enhancement individually, this outcome seems simpatico with the
§ 3553(a) principles: In no case did the evidence establish that the
aggravating circumstance had occurred, and therefore no increased
punishment should be imposed. But if we conducted an overall
evaluation of the case, we would find it over ninety percent likely
that at least one of the adjustments should have applied, and
accordingly, that the unenhanced sentence was contrary to the
§ 3553(a) sentencing standard. Conversely, if the evidence
establishes with fifty-five percent certainty that each of the four
upward adjustments should apply, then all four will apply. Yet when
considered in aggregate, the odds are less than ten percent that the
defendant will actually merit the full increase in his or her prison
term that will result. The § 3553(a) standard, if applied to the
situation as a whole, would favor a shorter sentence than the one the
Guidelines will recommend.
Rules with value-based triggers are normatively disaggregated,
and face a similar problem. 328 This time, imagine a defendant for
whom the sentencing judge finds that the facts almost satisfy-just
barely fall short of satisfying-the following normatively triggered
Guidelines' provisions: the defendant's crime targeted a "vulnerable"
victim (two-level increase), 329 the defendant was a "leader" in the
commission of the crime (two-level increase), 330 the defendant
"obstructed justice" with respect to the investigation and prosecution
of the crime (two-level increase), 331 and the defendant "recklessly
created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
another" while fleeing from a law enforcement officer (two-level

328. Professors Porat and Posner identify a few additional types of aggregation
puzzles. These include "cross-element factual aggregation," "within-element factual
aggregation," and "cross-person aggregation." See id. at 5-7.
329.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A.I(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING

COMM'N 2014).
330. Id. § 3B1.(c).
331. Id. § 3C1.1.
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increase) .332 Considered separately, none of these upward
adjustments will apply, even though, if their normative weights were
aggregated, their combined weight might be enough to merit an
increase in the defendant's offense level. Conversely, if the judge
finds that the normative threshold for each of the four upward
adjustments has just barely been satisfied, then the defendant's
offense level will increase by eight levels even though, if we
aggregated the normative weights, they would not seem to justify
such a significant increase.
Normatively disaggregated rules, then, produce outcomes in
tension with the background principles they are intended to
implement. For instance, if the evidence falls just short of satisfying
the normative threshold for four separate two-level upward
adjustments (say, vulnerable victim, leader in offense, obstruction of
justice, and reckless flight),333 none of the enhancements will apply,
and the defendant will suffer no increased punishment. Yet
considered in the aggregate, the crime is clearly quite serious, and
the § 3553(a) factors would counsel in favor of a longer sentence.
Conversely, if the evidence just barely crosses the normative
threshold for all four enhancements, then the defendant's offense
level will be increased by eight, and his recommended sentence
significantly increased, even though an overall evaluation of his
wrongdoing would show that his conduct was not quite so bad. The
§ 3553(a) sentencing standard, once again, would favor a more
lenient sentence.
b. Disaggregationin the Law of Sentencing
The law of sentencing gives judges some limited power to reject
the Guidelines' recommendations when they pose problems of
normative bumpiness, but not of probabilistic bumpiness. This is a
concern, especially for cases involving particularly numerous-and
thus particularly disaggregated-sentence adjustments. In such
cases, judges should vary from the Guidelines and instead sentence
based on the § 3553(a) standard, which allows them to conduct an
overall evaluation of the probabilities and norms at issue in the case.
The Guidelines' provision that concerns departures based on
multiple circumstances partially allows judges to correct errors
caused by normatively disaggregated rules. The provision reads as
follows:

332. Id. § 3C1.2.
333. See id. §§ 3Al.l(b)(1); 3B1.1(c); 3C1.1; 3C1.2.
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The court may depart from the applicable guideline range
based on a combination of two or more offender
characteristics or other circumstances, none of which
independently is sufficient to provide a basis for departure,
only if . . . such offender characteristics or other
circumstances, taken together, make the case an exceptional
one; and . . . each such offender characteristic or other
circumstance is . . . present to a substantial degree; and ...
identified in the guidelines as a permissible ground for
departure. 334
Here, the Guidelines recognize the problem posed by normative
disaggregation and provide a limited solution to it. According to the
provision, when a judge confronts a case in which multiple identified
grounds for departure are each present to a "substantial degree," but
none of which are sufficiently satisfied to justify a departure on its
own, he or she may combine their normative weight and use that
aggregated evaluation of the case as a ground for departure. This
recognition of normative disaggregation, however, is quite limited.
First, it does not apply to offense-level adjustments or criminal
history calculations, but only to grounds for departure. Second, it
does not account for probabilistic disaggregation-in other words, if
a judge were forty-five percent sure of the facts supporting several
different grounds for departure, the provision would not permit him
or her to depart on that basis.
The law of sentencing can and should expand judges' authority to
depart or vary from the Guidelines in order to correct for problems
caused by probabilistically and normatively disaggregated rules. It
should start with cases involving the most sentence enhancements
since these present the most extreme disaggregation. Imagine, for
instance, a case involving ten different two-level sentence
enhancements. Even if the sentencing judge is ninety percent
confident that all ten enhancements should apply, the overall odds
that the resulting twenty-level increase is justified will be less than
forty percent. 335 Imposing such a substantially
increased
punishment based on such a low overall level of certainty risks a
significant formal error. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict what
kinds of cases feature the largest number of sentence adjustments.
Every case is different, and the Guidelines provide such a broad

334.

Id. § 5K2.0(c).

335. If the odds that each enhancement has been properly applied are .9, then,
again, assuming that the evidence for each adjustment is independent, see Porat &
Posner, supra note 281, at 5 n.1, the odds that all ten will have been properly applied
are .910, which equals approximately .35 or thirty-five percent.
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array of sentence adjustments, both offense-specific 336 and
general,3 3 7 that any given set of facts might trigger a number of
different possible adjustments. The Sentencing Commission,
moreover, although it publishes an impressive set of data regarding
federal sentencing, does not make information available on the
number of sentence adjustments applied in each case. Therefore, this
is an important area for further study.
District courts have the authority under Booker to vary from
Guidelines' recommendations when they involve a particularly large
number of sentence adjustments. 338 When a judge sentences a
defendant based on the application of multiple sentence
adjustments, the recommended sentence will either fail to reflect an
overall evaluation of the strength of the evidence in the case
(probabilistic disaggregation) or the normative weight of that
evidence
(normative
disaggregation).
The
Guidelines'
recommendation will therefore fail to capture the principles of
sentencing set out in § 3553(a). Accordingly, under Booker, the
sentencing judge will have the authority to vary from the Guidelines
and instead perform a qualitative analysis of the case under the
§ 3553(a) sentencing standard, which will allow him or her to
aggregate the totality of the evidence and norms presented by the
case and impose a more accurate sentence. 339 On a policy level,
Congress and the Sentencing Commission should reform sentencing
law to take account of problems caused by disaggregated rules. To
make offense-level calculations less disaggregated, for example,
policymakers could limit the number of sentence adjustments that
may be applied in each case in order to ensure that recommended
sentences do not skew too far from an overall assessment of the case.
Alternatively, to account for the most disaggregated cases, they
could add a departure to the Guidelines for cases involving a
particularly large number of sentence enhancements.

336. See generally U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2014) (providing that each offense "may have one or more
specific offense characteristics that adjust the offense level upward or downward").
337. See generally id. ch. 3 (providing for adjustments based on the following
factors: (1) characteristics of the victim; (2) the defendant's role in the offense; (3)
whether the defendant obstructed or impeded the administration of justice; (4)
whether the defendant committed multiple counts; and (5) whether the defendant
accepted responsibility for the offense).
338. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2004).
339. See id.
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CONCLUSION

There are two basic ways to decide punishment: determinate
sentencing and indeterminate sentencing. Determinate sentencing
means that the legislature sets a defined punishment for each crime.
Indeterminate sentencing means that a judge has discretion to select
an appropriate punishment for each individual offender. Debates
over sentence determinacy have centered around three main
questions: Who should decide punishment? What makes punishment
fair? Why do we punish wrongdoers? In this Article, I asked a new,
fourth question: How should we decide punishment? I then explored
the role that rules and standards play in sentencing decisions. In
particular, I demonstrated how the federal law of departures and
variances is intended to correct the inevitable errors that result from
rule-based decision-making, although it is primarily focused on
substantive, rather than formal, errors.
Exploring the intersection between sentence determinacy and
legal form can teach us much on both fronts. First, the federal
Guidelines comprise an extremely rule-intensive decision-making
process, and both the Sentencing Commission and the judiciary have
expended considerable time and attention on identifying and
resolving the errors that sometimes result from that process. The
law governing departures and variances from the Guidelines thus
reflects the collected work and wisdom of countless policymakers and
judges attempting to identify and rectify the errors that occur when
rules are applied in the real world. By examining where and when
the law allows judges to reject Guidelines' recommendations, we can
learn more about all the ways that rule-based decision-making
sometimes fails, not only in sentencing, but across the board.
Second, the study of rules and standards provides a consistent
conceptual framework through which to view the law of sentencing.
By thinking about criminal punishment in this way, we can discover
connections, inconsistencies, and areas for improvement that we
may not have seen before.
Substantive and formal errors, as well as incomplete, incorrect,
bumpy, and disaggregated rules, are not unique to sentencing. They
are present any time legal decisionmakers use rules to resolve
disputes. Because policymakers cannot always have flawless
foresight or judgment, all rules will eventually commit the
occasional substantive error, either because they are incomplete or
incorrect. Even if policymakers could design perfectly complete and
correct laws, moreover, the binary and atomized structure of rules
makes them inherently bumpy and disaggregated, meaning that
they will inevitably commit formal errors. Remaining aware of these
errors is therefore vital not just in the law of sentencing, but in all
areas of our justice system.

